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Vikram Chand,* Svetislav Kostić** and Ariene Reis*** 
Taxing Artificial Intelligence and Robots: Critical 
Assessment of Potential Policy Solutions and 
Recommendation for Alternative Approaches – 
Sovereign Measure: Education Taxes/Global 
Measure: Global Education Tax or Planetary Tax 
In recent years, investments in technology have resulted in an exponential growth of AI/
robots. It is argued that some of these innovations are able to outperform and replace 
humans in various types of jobs. Accordingly, concerns regarding government revenues 
have been raised, as AI/robots could trigger widespread unemployment with the result 
that less tax revenue will accrue to the government. This contribution, as a start, analyses 
whether or not this is truly a concern. In order to do so, the authors map the Industrial 
Revolution(s) that humankind has witnessed and then conduct a literature review of 
economic and demographic studies relevant to the debate. The economic studies indicate 
two different directions, that is, some argue that AI/robots (Industry 4.0) will increase 
human jobs whereas others argue that jobs could disappear. At the same time, the 
demographic perspective indicates that a purely economic employment-focused view 
of AI/robots is bound to lead to inconclusive results. Assuming that this is a probable 
concern, the authors summarize selected measures taken by governments as well as the 
various options that have been considered in academic literature to introduce taxes on 
AI/robots. Subsequently, the authors analyse the various “taxing” options from the 
perspective of commonly accepted tax policy principles applicable to electronic commerce 
(Ottawa Taxation Framework conditions). This analysis indicates that several proposals 
(e.g. proposals that treat AI/robots as independently taxable subjects or proposals that 
attribute income to owners of AI/robots) breach the principles of (i) neutrality; (ii) 
simplicity and certainty; (iii) efficiency; (iv) effectiveness and fairness; and (v) flexibility. 
Thus, such measures should not be pursued. The authors also conclude that, at this stage, 
targeted taxes on AI/robots should not be introduced, as this would also be contrary 
to the measures taken by governments globally to promote research and development 
(R&D) (input or output incentives). The present contribution therefore suggests that 
governments need to be proactive rather than reactive in this area. This could be achieved 
by monitoring the impact of AI/robots on a regular basis, and if the trend indicates that 
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jobs are disappearing or revenues are declining, then the article suggests that states raise 
funds from an earmarked education tax. The funds raised from this tax, among other 
objectives, should be used to finance and foster professional educational programmes 
to reskill workers, besides assisting and guiding them to transition into new roles. 
However, a national measure may not be sufficient to tackle the issue (issues) at stake, 
especially in light of the demographic perspective discussed in the contribution. Thus, 
considering some jurisdictions may not be in a position to implement or fully benefit 
from an education tax, the authors also discuss the possibility of implementing a global 
fiscal redistribution mechanism (multilateral solution) from developed (surrender 
jurisdictions) to developing countries (recipient jurisdictions). The latter, depending on 
its scope, could be in the form of a global education tax or more broadly a planetary tax. 
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1.  Introduction 
Since time immemorial, individuals have represented the workforce. Although individuals 
have many unique skills that machines, at least for now, are unable to replicate, it cannot 
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be denied that AI/robots are being improved to play a role that is as similar as possible 
to human beings. Some factors may encourage the use of AI/robots over humans,1 such 
as, for instance: (i) robots can increase productivity, especially with respect to repetitive 
tasks;2 (ii) robots can mitigate mistakes, as they can be more precise and consistent than 
humans regarding some functions;3 (iii) working conditions for humans can be improved 
by avoiding workers performing arduous tasks (for example, heavy movements), which 
would then promote a safer work environment. Also, using robots could avoid accidents, 
for example, by keeping humans away from exposure to toxic substances;4 (iv) robots could 
also address worker-related shortages;5 (v) labour and production costs can be reduced,6 etc. 
Furthermore, it is a fact that some routine tasks can be eliminated through automation, and 
hence individuals can dedicate more time to non-routine tasks or leisure. 
Common examples of the widespread use of AI and robots include the use of (i) industri-
al robots in assembly lines and manufacturing in general; (ii) self-check-out machines at 
grocery stores; (iii) self-check-in machines at airports; (iv) self-payment vending machines 
for personal goods consumption, such as cigarettes, beverages and snacks; (v) self-order 
machines, such as those found at McDonald’s; (vi) self-driving cars; (vii) drones that can 
be used to take photographs or carry out deliveries and so on; and (viii) voice-activated 
assistants.
Moreover, some forms of AI/robots are becoming extremely popular for their performance, 
which can be on a par with or better than that of humans. Examples of service robots 
1. E. Lundström, 8 Reasons Why Companies Buy Robots – and No, It’s Not Just About Replacing People, Gain 
& Co (22 Mar. 2019), available at https://gainco.dk/en/8-reasons-why-companies-buy-robots/. 
2. Based on a McKinsey Survey, from 2015 to 2065, the productivity growth due to automation will increase 
from 0.8% to 1.4%. J. Manyika et al., Harnessing automation for a future that works, Mckinsey Global 
Institute (12 Jan. 2017), available at https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/digital-disruption/
harnessing-automation-for-a-future-that-works. 
3. Robots can maintain high standards when they perform repetitive tasks, which can then directly impact 
product or production quality. Especially in the food sector, the use of robots can reduce contamination 
that could be spread by human errors thereby exposing companies to high costs, waste of time and 
reputation. See M. Shatford. Reducing Contamination in the Workplace with Robotics, Universal Robots 
(4 Sept. 2017), available at https://blog.universal-robots.com/reducing-contamination-in-the-workplace- 
with-robotics. 
4. Based on a study presented by Universal Robots, the most common injuries in the workplace are: contact 
with harmful objects and chemicals, overworking, slips and falls, as well as accidents pertaining to repet-
itive movements. The same report indicates that, according to studies conducted by Travelers Insurance, 
cobots (“collaborative robot” that work hand-in-hand with humans without offering risks of injury) can 
help to reduce the incidence of workplace injuries by up to 72%. See Universal Robots, Automation: How 
Manufacturing Automation can Reduce Workplace Injuries and Improve Morale (May 2019), available at 
https://www.assemblymag.com/ext/resources/White_Papers/2019/sep/UR_Workplace-Injuries-White-
Paper-Final_May2019.pdf. 
5. For example, in the United States, there is a huge gap pertaining to employability in the construction 
sector in the sense that there are not enough workers available to execute contracts or projects. In 
view of that, contractors and developers have invested in robots. See J. Cilia, The Construction Labor 
Shortage: Will Developers Deploy Robotics?, Forbes (31 July 2019), available at https://www.forbes.
com/sites/columbiabusinessschool/2019/07/31/the-construction-labor-shortage-will-developers-deploy- 
robotics/#761d631b7198. 
6. For instance, according to a Eurostat report, hourly labour costs ranged from EUR 6.0 to EUR 44.7 across 
EU Member States in 2019. According to the report, labour costs comprised of wages and salaries, and 
non-wage costs (such as social security contributions). Eurostat Statistics Explained, Hourly Labor Costs 
(March 2020), available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Hourly_labour_
costs#Hourly_labour_costs_ranged_between_.E2.82.AC6.0_and_.E2.82.AC44.7_in_2019. 
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include: (i) the IBM Watson question-answering system and cognitive computing7 as well 
as IBM Watson for Oncology, which aids in supporting cancer treatment;8 (iii) Da Vinci, 
for medical and surgery purposes;9 (iv) Ross, specialized in legal research;10 (v) Milo, which 
provides education for autistic children;11 (vi) Shimon, which plays music;12 (vii) Motoman, 
which can be a chef and cook,13 and so on.
Based on the examples above, it may well be possible that at some point in time, in the 
perhaps not-so-distant future, AI/robots may overtake the human workforce in many 
areas and thereby cause massive job losses. This probability/prediction has an important 
impact on tax revenues for governments. As an illustration, countries could lose a signifi-
cant portion of their revenue collected from taxing regular employment income. Likewise, 
AI/robots, unlike humans, do not buy cars, clothes, food, electronic devices, nor contract 
services. Consequently, the production as well as consumption of goods and services may 
decline. A decline in consumption could affect VAT collection, that is, it could lead to lower 
VAT collection. In other words, employing AI/robots could cause tax distribution effects 
beyond employment-related tax collections.
Against this backdrop, the present contribution aims at analysing whether or not AI/robots 
should be taxed. In order for the authors to proceed with their analysis, this article is struc-
tured as follows. In section 2., the authors map out the Industrial Revolution that we have 
been through to understand its impact on society, in particular, employment patterns. In 
section 3., the authors conduct a literature review of economic studies that are relevant to 
the debate, while adding a demographic perspective to it. In section 4., the authors summa-
rize selected targeted options that have been considered for taxing AI/robots. The authors 
also analyse the various options from the perspective of relevant tax policy principles 
applicable to electronic commerce (Ottawa Taxation Framework conditions). In light of the 
assessment and discussion in the article, the authors put forward the idea of a sovereign 
measure, that is, an education tax (section 5.). Moreover, given the fact that a sovereign 
measure may not be sufficient to tackle the issue at stake, especially, in light of the broader 
demographic perspective discussed in the contribution, the authors discuss the possibili-
ty of implementing a global fiscal redistribution mechanism (multilateral solution) from 
developed (surrender jurisdictions) to developing countries (recipient jurisdictions). One 
such solution is to create a global education tax to foster education or awareness in develop-
ing or low-income countries. A much broader solution would be to introduce the so-called 
planetary tax, which would assist developing or low income countries in dealing with a wide 
range of planetary issues (section 6.). 
2.  Mapping the Stages of the Industrial Revolution
The Fourth Industrial Revolution, also known as Industry 4.0, deals with automation as 
well as data exchange and encompasses cyber-physical systems, cloud computing, cognitive 
7. For further details, see https://developer.ibm.com/dwblog/2017/best-practices-developing-question- 
answer-solutions-watson-conversation-discovery/.
8. For further details, see https://www.ibm.com/products/clinical-decision-support-oncology. 
9. For further details, see https://www.davincisurgery.com/.
10. For further details, see https://www.rossintelligence.com/. 
11. For further details, see https://robots4autism.com/milo/. 
12. For further details, see https://www.shimonrobot.com/.
13. For further details, see https://www.motoman.com/en-us/products/robots/industrial/assembly-handling/ 
sda-series/sda10d.
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computing, the internet of things (IoT), advanced robotics, big data, artificial intelligence, 
smart factory, and so forth.14 Since its inception, some studies, for example those carried 
out by Oxford University15 and PwC,16 have proposed that automation threatens the future 
of jobs done by humans. This is because new technologies have impacted all disciplines, 
industries and economies and in some cases have caused an abrupt change in the way peo-
ple live, work and interact. To illustrate, according to a press release from the International 
Federation of Robots (IFR), as of 18 September 2019, the global turnover from the sale 
of service robots for professional use increased to USD 9.2 billion. The largest portion of 
these sales was represented by autonomous robots (vehicles) used for logistics, and this was 
followed by robots used for inspection and maintenance. These two categories represent 
80% of the marketshare of professional services robots. At the same time, the sale of ser-
vice robots for personal use, in particular vacuum cleaning and lawn mowing robots, also 
increased.17 This development could indicate that a major disruption is on its way. However, 
the authors would like to point out that all industrial revolutions faced by society have in 
one way or another caused disruption.
If we look at history to understand how society organized itself after implementing innova-
tive changes, the First Industrial Revolution, which took place in the mid-1700s, marked the 
transition from blue-collar work to mechanical power. This transition, which started using 
machines, impacted many sectors, especially the textile manufacturing sector. Moreover, 
the innovation of the steam engine brought revolutionary changes in the iron and steel 
industry as well as the chemical, agriculture and transportation sectors.18 As it has been 
stated, “the first industrial revolution was accompanied by 70 years of economic stagnation. 
People were not prepared for the change that was taking place”.19
Although it is difficult to analyse data from that time, some experts affirm that during the 
pre-industrial society, hours of work used to depend on natural conditions (for example, cli-
mate circumstances and daylight) apart from limited opportunities of paid jobs. Conversely, 
after the First Industrial Revolution, with the implementation of machinery and new sourc-
es of power, work-related activities performed by humans were carried out all around the 
year and also during night shifts, which then led to an increase in the employment rates.20 
The Second Industrial Revolution began in the late 19th century and targeted the steel, 
automobile and electricity sectors in order to carry out mass production. The most signif-
icant change was the creation of moving assembly lines pioneered by Henry Ford, which 
14. I-Scoop, Industry 4.0: The Fourth Industrial Revolution – Guide to Industrie 4.0, available at https://
www.i-scoop.eu/industry-4-0/. 
15. M. Osborne & C.B. Frey, Automation and the Future of Work – Understanding the Numbers, Oxford 
Martin School (13 Apr. 2018), available at https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/blog/automation-and-the-
future-of-work-understanding-the-numbers/.
16. J. Hawksworth, R. Berriman & S. Goel, Will Robots Really Steal our Jobs? An International Analysis of 
the Potential Long-term Impact of Automation, PwC Report (2018), available at https://www.pwc.co.uk/
economic-services/assets/international-impact-of-automation-feb-2018.pdf. 
17. IFR, Service Robots – Global Sales Value Reaches 12.9 billion USD Says IFR, IFR Press Releases, 
(18 September 2019) available at https://ifr.org/ifr-press-releases/news/service-robots-global-sales-value-
reaches-12.9-billion-usd. 
18. H.K. Mohajan, The First Industrial Revolution: Creation of a New Global Human Era, 5 Journal of Social 
Sciences and Humanities 4, pp. 377-387 (2019).
19. Unil, The Risks of Human Skills Obsolescence Due to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence, Futures Lab, HEC 
Lausanne (30 Jan. 2020), available at https://wp.unil.ch/futureslab/2020/01/the-risks-of-the-human-
skills-obsolescence-due-to-the-rise-of-artificial-intelligence/?lang=en. 
20. D. Phyllis, The First Industrial Revolution pp. 285-295 (Cambridge University Press 1979).
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allowed the mass production of an entire automobile. Prior to this invention, a single 
vehicle used to take 12 hours to build whereas after using the assembly lines, the time to 
assemble a vehicle took around 90 minutes.21 At this stage, with the aim of avoiding long 
periods of stagnation, states already proposed education policies to reskill workers in order 
for them to adjust to the changes.22
This change led to other great innovations, for example the use of electricity for production 
and consumption purposes. Investments by companies to build research and development 
centres and investments in capital were encouraged due to the expansion of markets and 
studies regarding the management of personnel were designed in order to build and orga-
nize big corporations.23 Also, besides creating new jobs and roles for workers, the revolution 
triggered several inventions to make our daily lives safer and more comfortable, such as 
electric lighting, elevators, radio, light bulbs and telephones, in addition to plumbing and 
medical instruments, which reduced diseases and deaths. Additionally, the stock market, 
private banks and transportation systems were improved, and consequently lots of new 
businesses were developed.24 Overall economic activity, especially in the industrialized 
countries, was on the rise. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Third Industrial Revolution started bringing digital 
change. This was brought on by means of the development of electronic data processing 
capability in combination with mainframe computers. This development already led to a 
higher level of automation of routine office tasks.25 In the 1990s, desktops and personal 
computers connected with each other for the first time through Tim Berners-Lee’s World 
Wide Web. This era marked the beginning of a new world,26 as technological development 
impacted several sectors. It created new businesses especially in the fields of computing, IT, 
electronics and communications, and also led to the improvement of mobility, in particular 
transportation and logistics, which thus made distances shorter and increased velocity.
As can be seen throughout history, the previous industrial revolutions brought specific 
technologies that deeply changed society, shown in Figure 1.27 It also taught us how import-
ant those revolutions were for the development and growth of the economy, as well as how 
individuals, besides benefiting from them, adapted themselves to the various changes. 
According to what we have seen so far, the main impact of the industrial revolutions was 
on the industry sector. To understand the employment pattern or rates post-Industry 3.0, 
statistics provided by the World Bank indicate, after the emergence of the Internet, the 
following. If we consider the period from 1991 to 2019, the statistics indicate that the total 
employment reached rates lower that the employment rate established in 1991 (starting 
21. Ford, New Goals for Advanced, Flexible Manufacturing, 100 Years of the Moving Assembly Line (2020), 
available at https://corporate.ford.com/articles/history/100-years-moving-assembly-line.html.
22. Unil, supra n. 19.
23. D. Collucia, The Second Industrial Revolution (late 1800s and early 1900s) p. 52 (Springer 2012).
24. H.K. Mohajan. The Second Industrial Revolution has Brought Modern Social and Economic Developments, 
6 Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 1, pp. 1-14 (2020).
25. R.N. Khan. The Third Industrial Revolution: an Economic Overview, in The Third Industrial Revolution – 
Impact of Science on Society, No. 146, UNESCO Taylor & Francis, p. 115 (1987).
26. Tim Berners-Lee is a British computer scientist who made the first web page on the open internet. 
For further details, see World Wide Web Foundation, History of the Web (date), available at https:// 
webfoundation.org/about/vision/history-of-the-web/. 
27. Simio LLC, Simio's 8 Reasons to Adopt Industry 4.0, Cision PR Newswire (12 Apr. 2018), available at 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/simios-8-reasons-to-adopt-industry-4-0--300629039.html. 
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point) only during the period from 1992 to 2006. However, after 2006, those employment 
rates increased considerably.28 The one-off statistic might demonstrate that, after a techno-
logical revolution, society needs an “adjustment” period for its own reorganization and then 
it starts benefiting from the new technologies. In other words, employment levels increase 
after the “adjustment” period. 
Arguably, this conclusion may also indicate that employment levels could also increase 
during or after Industry 4.0 after an initial “adjustment” period. While this would be a 
guess at this stage, the main question that arises is whether individuals will adapt or adjust 
in the same manner with the changes that Industry 4.0 might or will bring. In this regard, 
a scholar remarks that “people are naturally anxious about the effects of such technology”.29 
In fact, because of this, some groups defend policies to slow or even ban the development of 
AI/robots.30 Thus, people have legitimate concerns about the impact that automatization, in 
particular AI/robots, may have on their jobs. The next part of this article will survey eco-
nomic literature to determine whether the concern is legitimate or not. To this, the authors 
will add a demographic perspective. 
28. World Bank, Employment in Industry (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate), International 
Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database (21 June 2020), available at https://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/SL.IND.EMPL.ZS. 
29. M. James, Here’s How Bill Gates' Plan to Tax Robots Could Actually Happen (20 Mar. 2017), Business 
Insider, available at https://www.businessinsider.com/bill-gates-robot-tax-brighter-future-2017-3?r=US& 
IR=T. 
30. D. Castro & M. McLaughlin, Ten Ways the Precautionary Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial 
Intelligence, ITIF – Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (4 Feb. 2019), available at https://
itif.org/printpdf/8235. 
Figure 1 – Industrial revolutions throughout history
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3.  Survey on the Impact of AI and Robots on Jobs 
3.1.  Economic literature relevant to the debate 
Due to the fast pace at which technology improves, the world has experienced the ability of 
AI/robots to assume tasks that were once done only by humans. Numerous analyses have 
been made to envisage the economic impact this revolution will bring and the authors will 
highlight a few of them. 
First, it would be interesting to measure how much revenue states collect from payroll 
taxes on wages and self-employment income (social security contributions). As an example, 
research carried out by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (an American non-par-
tisan research and policy institute) indicates that, in 2019, 35.9% of US federal revenue was 
derived from payroll taxes,31 as it can be seen in Figure 2: 
Moreover, data released by the European Union in 202032 shows the significance of revenues 
derived from taxing wages: in 2018, 51.7% of the tax revenue of the European Union was 
obtained from taxes on labour (which is broader than the one discussed in Figure 2), as per 
the middle row of the graph seen in Figure 3. 
In light of the above, it seems that tax collection from formal employment is a high and 
relevant source of revenue for governments. Thus, the second question arises as to what the 
extent is of the impact of AI/robots on the workforce. Specifically, the question is whether 
jobs will increase or decrease.
This question is surely not new. Almost a century ago, in 1927, James Davis, Secretary of 
Labor who used to work with President Calvin Coolidge, stated that “we must ask ourselves, 
‘Is automatic machinery …going to leave on our hands a state of chronic and increasing 
31. CBPP, Federal Payroll Taxes, Policy Basics (17 Apr. 2019), available at https://www.cbpp.org/research/
federal-tax/policy-basics-federal-payroll-taxes. It should be mentioned that “payroll taxes” as used in the 
United States do not encompass individual income tax.
32. European Commission Taxation and Customs Union, Taxation Trends in the European Union – Data for 
the EU Member States, Iceland and Norway p. 21 and pp. 264-265 (European Union 2020), available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/taxation_trends_report_2020.pdf. 
Figure 2 – Payroll taxes as a share of federal revenues
Note: “Other federal taxes” include individual and corporate income taxes, estate and gift taxes, excise taxes, profits on 
assets held by the Federal Reserve, customs duties and fees, and other smaller revenue sources.
Source: Office of Management and Budget (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, cbpp.org)
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unemployment?’”.33 Interestingly, in 1962, President John F. Kennedy remarked “I regard it 
as the major domestic challenge to maintain full employment at a time when automation, 
of course, is replacing men”.34 
In this regard, the OECD’s latest data (2019) on “The Future of Work” affirms that “the risk 
of automation is real but varies across countries”. The data highlights that 14% of jobs could 
be completely automated, while 32% could change significantly. In addition, six out of ten 
adults have no information communication technology (ICT) skills nor computer expe-
rience.35 The data goes on with its finding that automation will have a major effect on the 
manufacturing industry as well as the agriculture sector, as several jobs within these sectors 
require low skills.36 In fact, towards this end, the data indicates that orders for industrial 
robots have tripled over the last decade. The chart in Figure 4 shows the percentage share of 
jobs at risk due to automation in countries that are considered economic powers.37 
The European Commission indicates that, based on studies, in a worldwide context around 
2 billion jobs will be lost by 2025/30. However, 375 million new positions will be generated.38 
Moreover, McKinsey believes that, depending on the speed of adopting automation, any-
where between 10 million and 800 million jobs worldwide could be displaced by 2030. 
Regarding the creation of new jobs, the same organization considered that as global 
consumption may grow around USD 23 trillion between 2015 and 2030, jobs could also 
33. J.J. Davis, Productivity of Labor and Industry, 25 Monthly Labor Review 3 (Sept. 1927), available at https://
www.jstor.org/stable/41860549?seq=1; and Atkinson, infra n. 50, at p. 17. 
34. See the former US President being interviewed. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 
News Conference 24 (14 Feb. 1962), available at https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/
john-f-kennedy-press-conferences/news-conference-24; and Atkinson, infra n. 50, p. 17.
35. OECD, Data on the Future of Work, The Future of Work (2019), available at http://www.oecd.org/future-
of-work/reports-and-data/data-infographics.htm. 
36. OECD, Putting Faces to the Jobs at Risk of Automation, Policy Brief on the Future of Work (Mar. 2018), 
available at https://www.oecd.org/employment/Automation-policy-brief-2018.pdf. 
37. OECD, Employment Outlook 2019, The Future of Work (2019), available at https://doi.org/10.1787/9ee00155-
en. 
38. European Commission, Impact of Automation on the Number of Jobs, Knowledge for Policy (2018), avail-
able at https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/visualisation/impact-automation-number-jobs_en.
Figure 3 – EU-27 tax revenues according to type of tax base, 2006-2018 (% of total taxes)
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increase. It indicates that potential jobs created from seven catalysts of labour demand 
could amount to anywhere between 555 million and 890 million. Moreover, several million 
new jobs (which do not exist currently) are expected to be created.39
Similarly, a study conducted by the Asian Development Bank, which analysed the period 
from 2000 to 2015, concluded that by adopting more industrial robots, positive changes are 
verified in the employment portion of non-routine analytic jobs, while a negative transfor-
mation occurs in the share of routine manual tasks.40
Also, Oxford Economics’ research found that, by 2030, 20 million manufacturing jobs 
worldwide could be replaced by robots (see Figure 5).41 
At the same time, the report indicates that “it would be simplistic to characterise robotiza-
tion as only a destroyer of jobs. While certain sets of workers lose their jobs to robots, many 
in the wider population benefit from a ‘robotics dividend’”. In particular, the report states 
that “[w]e found that a 1% increase in the stock of robots per worker in the manufacturing 
sector alone leads to a 0.1% boost to output per worker across the wider workforce. This 
confirms our hypothesis: that by displacing automatable jobs in manufacturing, robots free 
39. J. Manyika et al. Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: What the Future of Work will Mean for Jobs, Skills, and Wages, 
Mckinsey Global Institute, pp. 10-11 (28 Nov. 2017), available at https://www.mckinsey.com/featured- 
insights/future-of-work/jobs-lost-jobs-gained-what-the-future-of-work-will-mean-for-jobs-skills-and-
wages.
40. G.J. de Vries, E. Gentile, S. Miroudot & K.M. Wacker, The Rise of Robots and the Fall of Routine Jobs, 
Economics Working Paper (2020), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/WPS200236-2. 
41. Oxford, How Robots Change the World – What Automation Really Means for Jobs and Productivity, 
Oxford Economics (June 2019), available at https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/2240363/Report%20-% 
20How%20Robots%20Change%20the%20World.pdf ?utm_medium=email&amp;_hsenc=p2AN 




Figure 4 – Share of jobs at high risk of automation or risk of significant change (%)
Note: Jobs are at high risk of automation if the likelihood of their job being automated is at least 70%. Jobs at risk of 
significant change are those with the likelihood of their job being automated estimated at between 50 and 70%. Data 
for Belgium correspond to Flanders and data for the United Kingdom to England and Northern Ireland.
Source: OECD calculations based on the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012), http://www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/; and 
L.  Nedelkoska & G. Quintini, Automation, skills use and training, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working 
Papers, No. 202 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1787/2e2f4eea-en.
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up many workers to contribute productively elsewhere in the economy, as they meet the 
demands generated by lower prices for manufactured goods”. The report further states that 
“jobs are both created and destroyed through the increased use of automation and indus-
trial robots”.42 Moreover, it concludes that “we found that a faster adoption of robots has 
a positive impact on both short- and medium-term growth. For example, boosting robot 
installations to 30% above the baseline forecast by 2030 would lead to an estimated 5.3% 
boost in global GDP that year. This equates to adding an extra $4.9 trillion per year to the 
global economy by 2030 (in today’s prices) – equivalent to an economy greater than the 
projected size of Germany’s”.43
In relation to the future employment outlook, the World Economic Forum has estimated 
that 75 million jobs will disappear due to the division of labour between individuals and 
machines, while 133 million new positions may be created. However, the forum informs the 
reader that such data should be used cautiously.44 
In a similar vein, Katja Mann and Lukas Püttmann recently demonstrated that an industry 
with more automation-related patents – which can be defined as a proxy for the creation of 
new types of robots and similar technologies – tends to create more jobs rather than drop 
them. In view of that, their research indicates robots can complement the human workforce 
instead of displacing them, even in case those robots are supposed to change the type of 
work performed by humans.45 
This analysis resonates with the statement made by Senator Paul H. Douglas year 1930, who 
affirmed that “the improved machinery and greater efficiency of management do not throw 
workers permanently out of employment. Instead they raise the national income and enable 
the level of earnings and of individual incomes to rise”.46
42. Id., at pp. 34-37. 
43. M. Simon, What is a Robot?, Wired (24 Aug. 2017), available at https://www.wired.com/story/what-is-a-
robot/. Id., at p. 6. 
44. WEF, The Future of Jobs Report 2018, Insight Report of the Centre for the New Economy and Society, 
pp. 8-9 (2018), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs_2018.pdf. 
45. K. Mann & L. Püttmann, Benign Effects of Automation: New Evidence from Patent Texts, SSRN Working 
Papers (15 Aug. 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959584. 
46. J.R. Commons, Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy, Vol. I, p. 550 (Transaction 
Publishers 2009); and R. Atkinson, infra n. 50, at p. 18.
Figure 5 – Projected cumulative job losses to automation, up to 2030
Source: Oxford Economics.
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Another category of data that is important for analysing the issue at stake is the unemploy-
ment rate in countries where automation can be found at higher levels. Based on a study 
conducted by the World Economic Forum,47 in 2017, South Korea48 was considered the most 
automatized country in the world (710 industrial robots per 10,000 employees, especially in 
the electronics and electric sectors). The second place was occupied by Singapore, which had 
658 industrial robots per 10,000 employees, also mainly in the electronics sector. Germany 
(322 industrial robots per 10,000 employees) and Japan (308 industrial robots per 10,000 
employees) ranked third and fourth respectively, mostly in their automotive industries. The 
information regarding other countries can be found in Figure 6 as follows:
That said, it is also appropriate to verify the unemployment rates in the aforesaid countries 
during the same year (2017). Data indicates that (the unemployment rates) are as follows: 
in South Korea (3.7%), Singapore (2.2%), Germany (3.8%), Japan (2.8%), Denmark (5.8%), 
the United States (4.3%), Italy (11.3%), Netherlands (4.9%), Canada (6.3%), Spain (17.2%), 
Finland (8.8%), France (9.4%), Switzerland (3.1%) and China (3.9%).49 The statistics may 
47. N. McCarthy, These Countries Have the Most Robot Workers, World Economic Forum (1 May 2019), 
available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/infographic-the-countries-with-the-highest- 
density-of-robot-workers.
48. IRF, South Korea reached in 2018 a new record: about 300,000 operational industrial robots, IFR Press 
Releases (12 Dec. 2019), available at https://ifr.org/ifr-press-releases/news/korea-hits-new-record.
49. The data provided, regarding unemployment rates in 2017, was extracted from International Monetary 
Fund Website. IMF, Unemployment Rate, IMF DataMapper, available at https://www.imf.org/external/
datamapper/LUR@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/KOR.
Figure 6 – Countries with the highest density of robot workers
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indicate that, apart from some exceptions, the majority of the most automated countries 
had low unemployment rates. This in turn could probably (not definitely) imply that auto-
mation may not trigger widespread unemployment (since there could be other reasons). 
Another interesting economic point to analyse is how governments react to unemployment 
with the aim of reducing it. Robert Atkinson50 argues that the persons who bear the cost 
of the contributions paid by the employer are the employees themselves, not the employ-
er, although empirical literature demonstrates this conclusion as far from unanimous. 
According to Fuchs et al.,51 a survey conducted by 40 leading universities in the United 
States demonstrates that employers bear around 20% of costs regarding social contribu-
tions, while employees bear approximately 80% by means of lower net wages. A more recent 
survey conducted by Ángel Melguizo and José Manuel González-Páramo52 concluded, after 
analysing 52 empirical papers, that “a 1.0% increase in taxation reduces wages by 0.66%”, 
which means that employees bear around 2/3 of social security contributions. Additionally, 
Atkinson illustrates that the overall rate of employment is largely determined at the mac-
roeconomic level (not the microeconomic one) by providing the following example: A com-
pany, Joe’s Pizzeria, has hired workers to serve clients, prepare and deliver food, take care 
of administrative tasks and so on. In case the government fixes a higher minimum wage, 
prices at Joe’s Pizzeria will increase (since Joe has higher costs to pay his workers), which 
will consequently reduce the quantity of pizzas sold (due to high prices). Thus, based on the 
demand decrease, Joe does not need to employ as many workers, and because of that some 
people will be unemployed until they find new positions. As a result, the national unem-
ployment rate will be higher. In that situation, usually, the first measure taken by most gov-
ernments is to reduce interest rates, which will encourage spending and investing. This pro-
tective measure continues until the nation has good rates of employment again. Thus, even 
in the case of a one-time economic “shock” from a higher minimum wage, such an effect 
would be easily neutralized by federal monetary policy, and the economy would recover 
to full employment.53 Transposing this analysis to the issue at stake may perhaps indicate 
that if automation triggers unemployment or if the cost of hiring humans increases, then 
governments could intervene and use monetary policy tools to stimulate economic growth. 
As depicted, there is no consensus regarding how many jobs would be replaced in the future 
nor how many would be created as a result of automation.54 In the next section, the authors 
will discuss demographic data that is intrinsically related to employment matters.
50. R.D. Atkinson, The Case Against Taxing Robots, ITIF – Information Technology & Innovation 
Foundation, p. 16 (8 Apr. 2019), available at https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/08/case-against-taxing-
robots. 
51. V.R. Fuchs, A.B. Krueger & J.M. Poterva, Economists’ Views About Parameters, Values and Policies: Survey 
Results in Labor and Public Economics, 36 Journal of Economic Literature 3, (Sept. 1998), available at 
https://economics.mit.edu/files/19900. 
52. A. Melguizo & J.M. González-Páramo, Who Bears Labour Taxes and Social Contributions? A Meta-
analysis Approach, SERIEs 4 (2013), available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13209-012-
0091-x. 
53. Atkinson, supra n. 50. 
54. For a similar conclusion, see O. Mazur, Taxing the Robots, 46 Pepperdine Law Review, pp. 279-295 
(2019) available at https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1369&context=law_faculty; and 
M. Barros, Robots and Tax Reform: Context, Issues and Future Perspectives, 2 Intl. Tax Stud. 6, pp. 2-6 
(2019), Journal Articles & Papers IBFD.
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3.2.  The demographic perspective 
Despite the importance of the economic considerations previously presented, the debate 
illustrated above may be somewhat out of touch with the true challenges we are witnessing 
in our modern world, and reflects the notable (and maybe justified) fear from stepping out-
side the line of thinking which can be supported by previous historical experiences. 
Namely, it was not just during industrial revolutions that humankind had to face the conse-
quences of innovation on labour. The invention of the wheel, the discovery of the physics of 
simple leverage and the domestication of pack animals all had profound effects on human-
ity and our surroundings. In other words, one can say that perhaps the challenges of this 
latest industrial revolution are nothing out of the ordinary but are just a common step in 
our path of development. 
Furthermore, the potential political and societal consequences of the increasing reliance 
on AI and robots can also be deduced from the past. For example, reliance on slave labour 
in ancient Rome led to the emergence of the proletariat class, the poor, but free, urban 
masses without meaningful employment, as their potential jobs were performed by slaves. 
The Roman government needed to find ways to politically appease the turbulent proletar-
iat class, wherein its approach can be summed up in the famous Latin proverb panem et 
circenses – (free) bread and games (entertainment).
The analogy with ancient Rome is even more relevant today as that society tends to resemble 
ours in terms of cosmopolitanism. Namely, just as in those days, our wealthy metropolises 
today are a magnet for people all over the world and we sometimes truly feel as if the world 
has become one global village. However, as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has poignant-
ly reminded us, perhaps the world as a global village is just an illusion where our mindsets 
are still firmly based in the national state framework, particularly in times of strife, despite 
the fact that our problems cannot be solved within the national boundaries that our threats 
are blind to. The notable lack of solidarity in difficult times seen within several countries 
during the COVID-19 pandemic significantly testifies to a need to take on a more cynical 
position when analysing world affairs and to remind ourselves that different societies will 
have a different attitude to common global problems.
To illustrate this claim, it can be shown that reliance on AI/robots leads to completely dif-
ferent outlooks depending on the country paradigm we consider.
For example, let us view the problem of the potential adverse effect of AI/robots on employ-
ment from the perspective of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Asia’s fourth-largest 
economy55 and one of the innovation drivers of the planet. The UN predicts that the popu-
lation of South Korea, one of the few leading economies that has not been reliant on immi-
gration to fill the ranks of its workforce so far, now reaching 51.3 million, is at its peak or 
close to that number, and it will shortly start to decline. Under a moderate scenario, by the 
end of the century, South Korea is predicted to have under 30 million inhabitants, the same 
number as it had in 1966.56 Currently, in 2020, some 35 million people in South Korea are 
in the productive phase of their lives (ages 15 to 64), while in 2100 this number is predicted 
55. South Korea follows China, Japan and India respectively as Asia’s fourth largest economy in terms of 
GDP. 
56. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, World Population Prospects 2019 – Vol. II: Demographic 
Profiles, p. 943.
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to stand at under 15 million.57 On the other hand, while 15.8% of the population of South 
Korea is of the retirement age (65 and above) in 2020, by the end of the century, pensioners 
will account for 38% of the total population, with the young (those under 15) making up 
the remaining 12%.58 In other words, not only will an economy such as South Korea lose the 
potential to fill 20 million jobs in comparison to today relying only on internal resources 
(the drop in the active population from 35 to under 15 million), but actually, its demo-
graphic shift to the elderly (with the average age expected to surpass 90 in the same time 
frame)59 will require more resources being transferred to nursing and health care needs, 
which exponentially rise in the older strata of the society, it being precisely in the domain 
of nursing and tending to the needs of the elderly where it is predicted that we will still have 
to rely on the human touch.60
Japan, currently the world’s third-largest economy is expected to suffer a similar fate to that 
of South Korea, with its population almost halving by the end of the century (from a peak of 
128.5 million in 2010 to approximately 75 million in 2100, and even as low as 60 million by 
some estimates), with those over 65 accounting for close to 40% of the population already 
by 2050.61 
Finally, in Asia, China, currently the industrial powerhouse of the planet, is expected to lose 
at least 400 million people by 2100 (with some projections as high as 700 million), with the 
decline accelerating after 2050.62 As in the case of Japan and South Korea, China will have 
to seriously consider how to care for its increasingly aging population. 
On the other side of the Eurasian land mass, there is Europe, a continent as a whole facing 
identical demographic challenges as those described in the case of Japan and South Korea, 
but which is managing to stem the pace of the fall in population numbers by way of immi-
gration. However, in Europe we see notable differences in the ability to maintain population 
numbers (and thus that of the workforce) by relying on immigration inflows.
In the case of Italy, in the absence of immigration, the country’s population would shrink 
by some 20 million already by 2050, from approximately 60 to 40 million people, with those 
of retirement age making up more than a third of the population (the number of people 
above the age of 65 would increase by some 5 million in the same period within which the 
population would fall by 20 million). Just in order to maintain its population level by 2050, 
Italy would need to welcome more than 12.9 million immigrants (measuring from 1995 
until 2050), which would lead to post-1995 immigrants and their descendants making up 
29% of the population by 2050. However, even in the case of such an influx, the aging of the 
domestic population would lead Italy to have less active people (those aged 15 to 64) by 2050 
than it had in 1995. In order to maintain the same number of its active population, Italy 
would need almost 20 million immigrants by 2050, by which time the post-1995 immigrant 
57. Id.
58. Id. 
59. Id, at p. 942. 
60. See M. Chui, J. Manyika & M. Miremadi, Where Machines Could Replace Humans – And Where They 
Can’t (Yet), McKinsey Digital (8 July 2016), available at https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/
mckinsey-digital/our-insights/where-machines-could-replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet. 
61. United Nations, supra n. 56, at pp. 673-676. 
62. Id., at p. 385.
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population would account for 39% percent of the total population.63 Current immigration 
flows will allow Italy to maintain a population of 40 million by the end of the century, 
almost 7 million less than it had in 1950.64
Without immigration, Germany would have seen a population decline since the 1970s when 
the number of deceased overtook the number on newborns in that country,65 while out of 
all children born today in Germany approximately one quarter have mothers of foreign 
origin.66 According to a UN study, in order to maintain the ratio of workers to pensioners 
from 2000, an indicator crucial for the survival of our current social contract based on the 
Bismarck pension insurance model, Germany would need to integrate 188 million new 
immigrants by 2050.67 In comparison, this number stands at 533 million for Japan.68 
From a political perspective, countries like Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea and even 
China are faced with unique demographic challenges the likes of which they have not 
faced since the time of the great plagues that decimated their populations centuries ago (in 
Europe at least, we have not seen anything similar since the Great Plague from the mid-14th 
century, and perhaps in Central Europe, the Thirty Years War69). However, unlike pesti-
lence, the demographic decline at the moment is primarily targeting their young, with the 
numbers of the elderly rapidly increasing due to higher life expectancy. AI and automatiza-
tion of the economy may allow these societies to maintain their level of prosperity without 
the need to resort to such influxes of foreign migrants that may jeopardize the core of these 
societies, whose social cohesion has already been deeply shaken due to immigration.
At the same time when wealthy and prosperous countries are dealing with a steady 
demographic decline, impoverished parts of our planet are seeing a population explo-
sion. Nigeria, the most populous African nation, whose population now stands at close 
to 200 million, is expected to see more than 700 million inhabitants by the end of the 
century, provided current fertility rates are maintained.70 The same virtual quadrupling 
of the population is expected throughout Africa by 2100.71 In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, one of the poorest parts of the planet, the census now stands at approximately 90 
million people.72 Persons of retirement age make up less than 3% of the total population, 
while those aged 0 to 15 count for close to half of all inhabitants.73 The GDP per capita of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo is virtually 100 times lower that of the most developed 
countries in the world (with that same nation’s resources being the foundation of the wealth 
of many of those developed countries, such as Belgium) and thus this and similar societies 
63. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining 
and Ageing Populations? pp. 53-54 (United Nations 2001), available at: https://www.un.org/en/develop 
ment/desa/population/publications/pdf/ageing/replacement-chap4-it.pdf. 
64. United Nations, supra n. 56, at p. 999. 
65. Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), A Changing Population – Assumptions and Results of the 14th 
Coordinated Population Projection p. 17 (2019), available at https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-
Environment/Population/Population-Projection/_node.html.
66. Id., at pp. 31-32. 
67. United Nations, supra n. 63, at p. 42. 
68. Id., at p. 54. 
69. The Thirty Years’ War, which was fought from 1618 until 1648, lead to the death of more than 20% of the 
German population.
70. United Nations, supra n. 56, p. 871. 
71. Id., at p. 61. 
72. Id., p. 464.
73. Id. 
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are quite often unable to provide their citizens with basic public services such as education 
and health care, nor are they capable of developing the infrastructure needed for attracting 
investment, other than that oriented towards the exploitation of natural resources. Similar 
circumstances combined with comparable population statistics may sometimes be found in 
countries of Central America (nations such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua) and 
Central Asia (e.g. Afghanistan and Tajikistan) as well. 
The aforementioned societies are not only technologically underdeveloped, but the abun-
dance of freely available cheap labour and the lack of institutions to hold those abusing this 
labour to account make, similarly to ancient Rome, investments into technology economi-
cally unnecessary. Such a conclusion is best supported by the fact that mining for some of 
the world’s rarest and most valuable (particularly with respect to modern telecommuni-
cations) minerals in Africa (primarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo) is conducted 
in a way reminiscent of the late Neolithic.74 Unfortunately, the pure modernization of the 
processes currently handled by human labour would only lead to increased social strife in 
societies already engulfed in perpetual violence and political discontent. Therefore, in such 
societies, AI/robots can be seen as a completely unwelcome development as they are unable 
to find employment for their exploding populations, even with the current emigration 
outflows.
Herein the authors can present a rather troubling scenario of AI/robots being relied upon 
by wealthy countries to mitigate their own population decline and maintain prosperity 
levels, while avoiding fundamentally altering the national, ethnic, religious and cultural 
composition of their populations by way of immigration, as such changes may lead to grave 
turbulences with far reaching consequences. On the other hand, impoverished societies 
with rapidly growing populations need to find a way to employ their citizens, wherein they 
currently have limited need for AI/robots due to the abundance of labour within their bor-
ders. Emigration is currently serving as a valve to lower socio-political pressures in these 
countries, although it is also having a detrimental effect on their development potential 
due to the fact that it is the best and brightest who will as rule be welcomed first in foreign 
destinations.75 
To make things even more concerning, it would be necessary to take into account the now 
undisputable consequences of global warming. The rising of the world’s oceans, the increase 
in global temperatures and the decrease in the availability of fresh water are all expected 
to disproportionately affect poorer countries and are bound to trigger migrations towards 
places of refuge. Areas that will maintain endurable climate conditions and have sufficient 
freshwater supplies are those that can today be counted as the world’s most prosperous (e.g. 
Europe and North America).76 At the same time, climate change challenges will require 
74. S. Kara, Is your phone tainted by the misery of the 35,000 children in Congo’s mines?, The Guardian (12 Oct. 
2018), available at https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/12/phone-misery-chil 
dren-congo-cobalt-mines-drc; and H. Sanderson, Congo child labor and your electric car, Financial Times 
(7 July 2019), available at https://www.ft.com/content/c6909812-9ce4-11e9-9c06-a4640c9feebb. 
75. B. Kristijai, Tax and the Brain Drain: Justification, Policy Options and Prospect for Large Developing 
Economies, 67 Belgrade Law Review 4, p. 40 (2019). 
76. C. Xu, T.A. Kohler, T.M. Lenton, et al., Future of the Human Climate Niche, 117 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 
U.S.A. 21, pp. 11350-11355 (2020). 
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planetary action of unprecedented proportions and will inevitably be a source of so far 
unaccounted employment.77 
In summary, a purely economic, employment-focused view of AI/robots is bound to lead to 
inconclusive results. From a tax perspective, the same conclusion stands, as our tax policies 
have always been, or have at least tried to be, attentive to the broader implications of our 
social contracts. AI and the increasing use of robots in our economies may have a national 
as well as global perspective. On the other hand, the European migration crisis, climate 
change as well as the current COVID-19 epidemic painfully remind us that those focused 
on national boundaries will as a rule be flawed, as they have proved to be too porous to 
stop the spread of global threats. In other words, the equation that we need to solve is not 
as simple as the one of governments losing one of the key sources of tax revenue due to the 
disappearance of the individual taxpayer who will be replaced by AI/robots. The problem 
before us is how to adjust our tax policies to account for the technological, economic, demo-
graphic, climate and corresponding social changes that are already taking place, where the 
growing use of AI/robots present just one occurrence that cannot be viewed independently 
from the remaining novel elements of our brave modern world. Therefore, the issue may not 
be how to tax technology, but rather how to tax in a world where technology goes hand in 
hand with developments we have not witnessed for thousands of years (e.g. the prospective 
migrations of people, the stop in the global rise of population for the first time in history or 
climate change of a magnitude not seen since the end of the last Ice Age).
Putting aside the wider problem (to which we will return in sections 5. and 6.), the next 
section analyses the various proposals that have been contemplated in the literature or by 
governments to tax AI/Robots from the perspective of selected tax policy principles. 
4.  Taxing AI and Robots 
4.1.  Setting the assessment framework 
Before considering the various options that have been contemplated to date, it should be 
noted that any option for taxing AI/robots should be built on a sound policy rationale and 
well-established tax policy principles, for instance, such as those agreed in the context of 
the Ottawa Framework. The authors choose the Ottawa Framework, as that framework has 
been accepted by the tax administrations of several countries. 
According to the framework, the first principle deals with neutrality.78 This essentially 
means that a tax should apply across the board and should not differentiate between elec-
tronic and conventional commerce. Absolute neutrality is always difficult to achieve, but the 
introduction of a new tax should be as little distortive as possible.79 The second principle 
relates to certainty or simplicity, which in turn is linked to the third principle of efficiency.80 
The more complex the new tax is, the greater are the chances of it leading to higher com-
77. M.A. Brown & M. Ahmadi, Would a Green New Deal Add or Kill Jobs, Scientific American (17 Dec. 2019), 
available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/would-a-green-new-deal-add-or-kill-jobs1/. 
78. OECD, Taxation and Electronic Commerce – Implementing the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions 
p. 10 (OECD 2001), Primary Sources IBFD; and OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital 
Economy – Action 1: 2015 Final Report p. 20 (5 Oct. 2015), Primary Sources IBFD [hereinafter Action 1 
Final Report]. 
79. B. Peeters et al., The Concept of Tax, EATLP International Tax Series (Vol. 3), p. 31 (IBFD 2007), Books 
IBFD.
80. OECD, supra n. 78, at p.10; and Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 78, at p. 20.
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pliance costs for both taxpayers and tax administrations.81 Thus, aiming at being efficient, a 
new tax must also be simple, in the sense that its application entails overall low compliance 
costs. It should be noted that efficiency in this context should not be confused with efficient 
(neutral) outcomes associated with the location of production or output factors, as fre-
quently discussed in economic literature. Fourth, effectiveness and fairness considerations 
will also need to be looked into.82 Effectiveness implies that the government should be able 
to collect payment of the right amount of taxes at the right time. Fairness in this context 
implies that the potential for tax evasion and avoidance should be minimal. It could also 
imply that the opportunities for profit shifting should be as low as possible. Lastly, any 
proposals should be flexible.83 The principle requires tax systems to be dynamic in the sense 
that they can meet current and future revenue needs of the government. It is important to 
note that one principle need not be favoured over another and a balance needs to be struck 
among all of them. 
While the article will touch upon these principles, the focus is on the principle of simplicity 
or certainty. At the same time, within the analysis, the authors will also make reference 
to legal principles such as the ability to pay or benefits principle, as they are commonly 
accepted principles across the globe. Against this backdrop, the authors firstly summarize 
the selected targeted solutions that have been contemplated to date (see section 4.2.). Then 
the authors benchmark the solutions against the assessment framework (see section 4.3.) 
and then conclude with some remarks from an innovation perspective (see section 4.4.). 
It should be noted that general measures contemplated in the literature are discussed later 
(see section 5.3.). 
4.2.  Targeted measures to tax AI/robots
4.2.1.  AI/robots as taxable subjects 
The idea of taxing AI/robots has gained momentum quite recently. In 2017, Bill Gates, 
co-founder of Microsoft, heated up this tax debate. In an interview with Quartz, he stated 
that “right now, the human worker who does, say, $50,000 worth of work in a factory, that 
income is taxed and you get income tax, social security tax, all those things […] If a robot 
comes in to do the same thing you’d think that we’d tax the robot at the same level?”.84 Some 
commentators argue AI/robots should “receive”, probably on a deemed basis, the income as 
a separate taxable subject. By doing this, state revenues would not be strongly affected.85 For 
income tax purposes, one option would be to treat the AI/robot as an individual. Another 
option is to treat them as taxable legal entity type subjects.86 Similarly, with respect to 
indirect taxation, more specifically VAT matters, suggestions have been made that once AI/
robots are given legal personality and tax capacity, they can also be considered as taxable 
persons and, therefore, be subject to VAT.87
81. P. Pistone et al. eds., Fundamentals of Taxation: An Introduction to Tax Policy, Tax Law and Tax 
Administration sec. 2.1.3.4. (IBFD 2019), Books IBFD.
82. OECD, supra n. 78, at p. 10; and Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 78, at p. 20. 
83. Id. 
84. K.J. Delaney, The Robot that Takes your Job Should Pay Taxes, Says Bill Gates, Quartz (17 February 2017), 
available at https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-job-should-pay-taxes/.
85. X. Oberson, Taxing Robots – Helping the Economy to Adapt to the Use of Artificial Intelligence p. 131 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2019).
86. Id., at p. 133.
87. Id., at pp. 87-110..
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4.2.2.  Measures which target use of AI/robots
4.2.2.1.  Attributing income to the owner of the AI/robot 
This proposal contemplates that the owner of the AI/robots should be responsible for paying 
the imposed taxes for using such technology. Those taxes would be levied on fictional sala-
ries deemed to be attributed to the AI/robots that would be equivalent to the salary that an 
individual performing the same work would have received. The salary would be calculated 
by looking into comparable salaries.88 As a result, a neutralization of the loss of revenue 
(taxes and social security) due to automation is achieved. In order for this to happen, it is 
also necessary that the legislation recognizes a relation between the owner of the AI/robot 
and the AI/robot itself, similar to the relation between an employer and an employee (con-
sequently, for example, requiring a change to labour law). 
Members of some political parties have made similar proposals to tax an imputed income 
attributable to robots. For instance, Bill Blasio, New York’s mayor, defended the creation of 
a federal robot tax during his run as 2020 Democratic presidential candidate.89 According 
to his proposal, when a company replaces a worker due to automation, it would have to pay 
an amount equivalent to five years of payroll taxes for each replaced worker. Besides, his 
idea was also to create a regulatory agency (the name suggested was Federal Automation 
and Worker Protection Agency – FAWPA), that would be authorized to regulate advanced 
robotics, including artificial intelligence. In Canada, the Green Party has also proposed 
taxes on robots.90 The announcement, on 29 September 2019, proposes the idea that when 
a company replaces an individual with a machine, a tax equivalent to the income tax that 
would be paid by the laid-off employee will be charged.
4.2.2.2.  Object tax 
An object tax would be levied on the ownership of a robot and could be based on a flat rate 
or vary according to the type of robot; similar to what is done with assets in some juris-
dictions.91 The key challenge of this approach is that by taxing the property (that usually 
relates to tangible assets that have no autonomy or intelligence), this model conflicts with 
the underlying reason for taxing robots: since they are smart machines that can replace 
humans, they should be taxed as humans (subjects), not objects.
4.2.2.3.  Business taxation measures 
4.2.2.3.1.  Restricting deductions on expenditure for automated businesses
Several jurisdictions nowadays grant tax advantages to companies who invest in technol-
ogy and who acquire machines that improve efficiency and productivity. According to the 
OECD’s latest data, several jurisdictions have reinforced incentives concerning corporate 
88. Id., at pp. 114-116. 
89. J. Marsh. De Blasio Proposes ‘Robot Tax’ in Bid to Boost Failing 2020 Campaign, New York Post 
(5 Sept. 2019), available at https://nypost.com/2019/09/05/de-blasio-proposes-robot-tax-in-bid-to-boost-
failing-2020-campaign/. 
90. Green Party of Canada, Green Party Pledges to Fund AI Research, and Protect Workers from Jobs Lost 
due to Automation (29 Sept. 2019), available at https://www.greenparty.ca/en/media-release/2019-09-29/
green-party-pledges-fund-ai-research-and-protect-workers-jobs-lost-due. 
91. Oberson, supra n. 85, at pp. 129-130 and p. 134.
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tax incentives to encourage innovation.92 For example, the deductibility of invested capital 
for tax purposes.93 Such measures could be regarded as fostering the replacement of indi-
viduals. Accordingly, eliminating such tax advantages, based on a certain reported level of 
automation,94 could be one possible solution to slow down the replacement of humans by 
machines. 
Currently, South Korea, famous for being the most robotized country in the world, has 
changed its corporate tax code in order to provide disincentives for capital investments in 
technology by restricting certain deductions.95 This could be seen as an indirect “robot tax” 
since no new tax was created.96 Before the changes, a corporate tax deduction was allowed 
between 3% and 7% of the investment amount, according to the size of the business. From 
2018 to 2019, the rate was reduced by 2%.97 By studying the Korean system, Dimitropoulou 
recently discussed a measure to restrict tax incentives for businesses that use technology 
(AI/robots) that are close substitutes for the human workforce.98 
Another proposal that restricts deductions was made by Vincent Ooi and Glendon Goh. 
Their proposal called “reverse depreciation” is based on the premise that companies that 
adopt a certain level of automation as complementary functions (it means none or low levels 
of human workforce replacement) would be allowed to deduct higher amounts in relation to 
capital expenditure, whilst companies that invest in automation causing more replacements 
of humans, would be authorized to deduct only a small share of the capital investment.99
4.2.2.3.2.  Higher corporate tax rates for automated businesses 
An alternative to the foregoing “robot tax” is a relevant increase in corporate income tax 
rates for automatized businesses.100 In this sense, companies that replace the human work-
force by AI/robots are expected to be more productive and consequently make higher prof-
92. OECD, Tax Policy Reforms 2020: OECD and Selected Partner Economies (OECD 2020), available at https://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/7af51916-en/1/1/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/7af51916-en&_
csp_=8a96f5eedbc1947f715e8fc47d48f410&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book.
93. Various countries allow tax deductions for investment-related expenses. Those capital expenditures may 
be related to the purchase of assets such as computers, machinery, vehicles and robots, depending on the 
legislation of each state. In some cases, operational expenditures are allowed to be fully tax deducted, 
while capital expenditures are allowed to be depreciated or gradually deducted. See, for example, PWC, 
United Kingdom – Corporate Deductions, Tax Summaries (6 Jan. 2020), available at https://taxsummaries.
pwc.com/united-kingdom/corporate/deductions. 
94. R. Abbott & B. Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12 
Harvard Law & Policy Review (2018), p. 169 (15 Mar. 2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2932483. 
95. Barros, supra n. 54, at p. 12.
96. R. Kovacev, A Taxing Dillema: Robot Taxes and the Challenges of Effective Taxation of AI, Automation 
and Robotics in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, 16 Ohio State Technology Law Journal, p. 204 (26 May 
2020), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3570244.
97. M. Hammer, Brave New World: Automation, Unemployment and Robot Taxes, White Paper (3 July 2019), 
Journal Articles & Papers IBFD. For more information, see also C. Dimitropoulou, Scaling Back Tax 
Preferences on Artificial Intelligence-Driven Automation: Back to Neutral?, 12 World Tax J. 2, sec. 3.1.2. 
(2020), Journal Articles & Papers IBFD. 
98. See also Dimitropoulou, supra n. 97, at sec. 4. 
99. V. Ooi & G. Goh, Taxation of Automation and Artificial Intelligence as a Tool of Labour Policy, SMU 
Centre for AI & Data Governance Research Paper No. 2019/01 (2 Feb. 2019), available at http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.3322306. 
100. Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra n. 94, at pp. 172-173.
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its. Therefore, a higher tax rate will be levied on a higher taxable basis, resulting in higher 
revenue collection for governments, besides increasing taxation on capital instead of labour.
4.2.2.3.3.  Automation taxes
Another idea is the implementation of automation taxes. Such taxes are addressed to busi-
nesses/companies which engage fewer and fewer employees. In other words, these taxes aim 
at reducing the laying off and/or replacement of employees by AI/robots. A few options to 
introduce such taxes is discussed hereafter. 
One option for introducing such taxes is to charge employers (businesses) for unemploy-
ment insurance in proportion to their human employment rate. This means that the higher 
the rate of layoffs or replacements made, the more the employer would contribute to gov-
ernment revenue by paying more taxes.101 It would indeed work as a kind of compensation 
for layoffs. Therefore, businesses that decide to replace the workforce by using AI/robots 
would contribute more since the government would need more money to help those people 
who are out of the market, even temporarily. In this regard, an agency could be created to 
develop a system and control and collect all data concerning layoffs and replacement to 
inform tax authorities. 
Another option is the idea of a corporate self-employment tax that would increase the tax 
burden for companies that produce goods or provide services without using a human work-
force. This model could be compared to the self-employment tax for individuals enforced 
in some jurisdictions (situations where the owner of a small business is supposed to pay 
social security, similar to the social security that would be paid on their wages if they were 
an employee).102 The main goal here is also increasing the collection to guarantee support to 
those who are unemployed due to automation. For calculation purposes, a ratio of corporate 
profits to gross employee compensation expense could be used. In case this ratio surpasses 
a threshold fixed by the government, additional taxes could be applied on corporate profits. 
These additional taxes would reflect the amount that the companies avoided paying because 
of implementing automation. Alternatively, instead of profit ratio, the sales ratio could also 
be contemplated for this purpose. 
Lastly, an alternate proposal to curtail investment in technology is to extend tax benefits for 
companies that hire people. Those tax benefits, for example, could be granted by means of 
reduction or exemption from social contributions or contributions to Medicare systems lev-
ied on the payroll. Another tax benefit that could be given is the super-deduction of wages 
paid to humans.103 These benefits would ensure that humans and machines are treated, for 
tax purposes from the employer standpoint, in the same manner or at least in a very similar 
way, since machines do not receive wages subject to taxation, and several jurisdictions grant 
accelerated tax deductions for the implementation of technologies that are presumably sup-
posed to increase productivity.
Another solution presented is to introduce narrowly targeted taxes. In 2017, the Grand 
Council of the Canton of Geneva, in Switzerland, proposed a tax on each automated 
cashier installed in the retail sector – a tax on automated cashiers. The automated cashier 
101. Id., at pp. 170-171.
102. Id., at pp. 171-172.
103. Id., at p. 171.
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was defined as “any device for the payment of purchases that the customer can use without 
the intervention of store personnel”.104 This proposal was rejected. In 2018, San Francisco 
County and City enacted AB1184 establishing a new tax on rides made by autonomous vehi-
cles.105 According to the text, the tax will be levied “on each ride originating in the City and 
County of San Francisco provided by an autonomous vehicle, whether facilitated by a trans-
portation network company or any other person, or by a participating driver in an amount 
not to exceed 3.25% of net rider fares, as defined, for a ride and 1.5% of net rider fares for a 
shared ride”. Both models, instead of imposing taxes on AI/robots in general, chose to levy 
taxes on a specific new service or type of automation. Such taxes therefore intend to create 
a direct link between the tax imposed and remediation of job losses.106
4.2.2.4.  VAT measure 
Sam Mitha107 suggests taxation on the valued added by the implementation of AI/robots. 
This proposal is based on the premise that, by adopting those technologies, companies are 
supposed to be more profitable. It is proposed, therefore, that businesses monitor the value 
that was aggregated due to the AI/robots and subject such amount to a higher tax rate (VAT 
rate). As an alternative, the author proposes that businesses whose ratio of turnover to the 
number of employees was above an established threshold could be subject also to a higher 
tax rate of VAT on their goods and services. Another option is to disallow input VAT on 
automation-related purchases.108 
4.3.  Assessment of the targeted measures
Policy rationale 
All the proposals discussed above are based on the policy rationale that AI/robots can cause 
widespread unemployment and replace humans. However, the data put forward in section 
3. indicates that there are different views on this issue and a purely employment-focused 
view will lead to inconclusive results. Hence, the policy rationale of all the above proposals 
is indeed questionable. The authors would thus be inclined to say that it is not advisable 
to implement changes on the basis of potential losses of tax revenues that have not been 
established.
Neutrality
Assuming the policy rationale can be justified, we start with neutrality. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that the tax system should be neutral in the sense that it should not incen-
tivize businesses to engage AI/robots as compared to humans. In other words, as robots 
can perform tasks similar to those carried out by humans, the tax costs to engage AI/robots 
should be as high as the tax costs to hire the human workforce. 
104. CH: Projet de loi 12064-A, Article 7, available at https://ge.ch/grandconseil/data/texte/PL12064A.pdf.
105. US: Assembly Bill 1184, available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_
id=201720180AB1184. Curiously, since 10 March 2020, Uber started testing autonomous vehicles in the 
city. A.J. Hawkins, Uber has Resumed Testing its Self-driving Cars in San Francisco, The Verge (10 Mar. 
2020), available at https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/10/21172213/uber-self-driving-car-resume-testing-
san-francisco-crash. 
106. Kovacev, supra n. 96, p. 207.
107. S. Mitha, Robots, Technological Change and Taxation, Tax Journal (14 Sept. 2017), available at https://
www.taxjournal.com/articles/robots-technological-change-and-taxation-14092017.
108. Barros, supra n. 54, at p. 13.
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But the key fundamental question is: are AI/robots really comparable to human beings 
and workers? In our view, human beings, in comparison to AI/robots, have features such 
as free will, creativity, emotional experience, gut feelings, etc., and these attributes are rel-
evant even in performing routine jobs. In light of these attributes, it seems that AI/robots 
and humans are not comparable and, therefore, the neutrality argument that considers AI/
robots on an equal footing with humans is incorrect.109 Consequently, any proposals that 
are built on the logic that AI/robots are perfect or close substitutes for humans are indeed 
questionable. Such proposals also do not factor in the possibility that a substituted indi-
vidual, unlike AI/robots, can find alternate employment. Moreover, if businesses are taxed 
higher if they invest in AI/robots (e.g. if they are classified as capital assets and depreciation 
expenses are limited or restricted) as compared to other capital investments, then it is quite 
clear that the tax system gives preference to investments in the latter (e.g. capital expenses 
incurred for developing a new generic pharmaceutical product). There seems to be no jus-
tification for this.110 
On the other hand, it could be argued that all the proposals made in sections 4.2.1. and 
4.2.2. target taxpayers (especially businesses) engaged in electronic commerce, or busi-
nesses and industries in automation (for example, measures that deem AI/robots as taxable 
subjects or target the use of AI/robots).111 In other words, taxpayers (especially businesses) 
who create or who own or use AI/robots are impacted by such measures. Thus, such taxes 
(including automation taxes) could be considered non-neutral112 for businesses that create 
or use such technologies, as such businesses would need to comply with special rules. On 
a separate but related note, the OECD in the context of Action 1 of the BEPS Project has 
repeatedly stated that the digital economy cannot be ring-fenced. As a result, digital service 
taxes (DSTs) or digital permanent establishments (PEs) are widely criticized in academic 
scholarship, as they breach the principle of neutrality since they apply to selected electronic 
businesses or business models. In light of that logic, the targeted proposals highlighted 
above may amount to ring fencing due to their selected applicability or impact on automat-
ed businesses. 
Simplicity and certainty 
Moving on to simplicity and certainty, taxing AI/robots as independent taxable subjects 
(see section 4.2.1.) leads to several complications and surely creates an uncertain tax envi-
ronment. To start with, the question arises as to how to define AI/robots.113 Should the 
definition include a simple vending machine or an ATM, which has already been part of 
our daily lives for a considerable time, or a sophisticated self-driving car? How different is 
a self-driving car from an autopilot, which has been used in airplanes for a very long time? 
Oberson, for example, suggests that AI/robots possess sufficient autonomy and a capacity to 
learn, progress and make decisions.114 Englisch affirms that “a definition must reconcile the 
two potentially conflicting objectives of legal certainty, on the one hand, and flexibility, on 
the other hand. It must allow for a clear delimitation of the substantive – or personal – scope 
109. Oberson, supra n. 85, at p. 133.
110. Mazur, supra n. 54, at p. 299.
111. Barros, supra n. 54, at p. 8.
112. M. Burton, Economic Income and the Search for a Fair and Simple Income Tax (1996), unpublished paper 
presented to the 1996 Conference of the Australian Tax Teachers’ Association.
113. For a critique, see also Mazur, supra n. 54, at pp. 298-299.
114. Oberson, supra n. 85, at pp. 13 and 15.
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of the tax, while at the same time it must be future-proof and comprehensive enough to take 
into account the relevant technological progress”.115 Also, Falcão recommends that a proper 
definition must consider the objectives of the robot tax, in addition to the socio-economic 
situation of the jurisdiction that aims at defining it,116 as shown by the importance of the 
data and analysis done in section 3.
Even among roboticists, there is no consensus concerning this concept. A robot can be 
defined simply as “a machine controlled by a computer that is used to perform jobs auto-
matically”.117 On the other hand, ISO 8373:2012 states that a robot is an “actuated mech-
anism programmable in two or more axes (4.3) with a degree of autonomy (2.2), moving 
within its environment, to perform intended tasks”.118
Although the European Union rejected a proposal to implement a robot tax,119 the 
Parliament drafted some recommendations related to Civil Law Rules on Robotics and 
approved the text on 16 February 2017. The Resolution does not define AI/robots, but 
provides in the Annex some common features, such as: (i) capacity to acquire autonomy 
through sensors and/or by exchanging data (inter-connectivity) and the analysis of those 
data; (ii) capacity to learn from experience and by interaction; (iii) form of robot’s physical 
support; and (iv) capacity to adapt its behaviour and actions to the environment.120
In light of the above differences, consider the following example by William Weissman: 
Take a calculator as an example: it can help workers to perform their calculation tasks 
quicker. Would it be considered a robot if formulas and algorithms are used? How can it be 
determined if the use of a calculator causes job losses or only slows hiring?121 
Thus, the following proposals, as a start, would require a proper definition of the term AI/
robots. Developing a definition for both non-tax law and tax law purposes could indeed be 
challenging.122 
115. J. Englisch, Digitalisation and the Future of National Tax Systems: Taxing Robots?, SSRN Working Papers, 
p. 4 (5 Sept. 2018), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3244670.
116. T. Falcão, Should My Dishwasher Pay a Robot Tax?, Tax Notes International (11 June 2018).
117. Cambridge Dictionary, available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/robot. 
118. ISO, available at https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:8373:ed-2:v1:en. This definition is also used by 
the International Federation of Robots (IFR), as it can be verified in its official website, available at https://
ifr.org/industrial-robots. Moreover, the IFR has adopted a classification since 2004 based on robots’ 
mechanical structure, which is divided into seven categories: (i) linear robots (including cartesian and 
gantry robots); (ii) SCARA robot (a robot which has two parallel rotary joints to provide compliance in a 
plane); (iii) articulated robot (a robot whose arm has at least three rotary joints); (iv) parallel/delta robot 
(a robot whose arms have concurrent prismatic or rotary joints); (v) cylindrical robot (a robot whose 
axes form a cylindrical coordinate system); (vi) others; and (vii) Not classified. (IFR, WR Industrial 
Robots 2019, p. 24 (2019), available at https://ifr.org/downloads/press2018/WR Industrial Robots 2019_
Chapter_1.pdf.) 
119. Reuters, European Parliament Calls for Robot Law, Rejects Robot Tax, Technology News (16 Feb. 
2017), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-robots-lawmaking/european-parliament- 
calls-for-robot-law-rejects-robot-tax-idUSKBN15V2KM.
120. EU: Resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-
0051_EN.html. 
121. W.H. Weissman, Why Robot Taxes Won’t Work, Tax Notes Commentaries (5 Apr. 2018) Journal Articles 
& Papers IBFD.
122. On this issue, see also L.L. Carvalho, Spiritus Ex Machina: Addressing the Unique BEPS Issues of 
Autonomous Artificial Intelligence by Using ‘Personality’ and ‘Residence’, 47 Intertax 5, pp. 430-433 (2019). 
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Despite the challenges associated with the definition, the first issue in attributing income to 
AI/robots is the recognition of “legal personality”. It should be mentioned that ‘‘personali-
ty’’ does not involve a physical or natural concept, but the capability of being the subject of 
rights and obligations. This would involve the possible for AI/robots, for example, to hold 
assets, sue or be sued, enter into agreements and so on.
To illustrate, Sophia, a social humanoid robot, created by Hanson Robotics,123 was given 
citizenship of Saudi Arabia (in 2017).124 It means, in theory, that she has the same rights 
and obligations of any woman who has Saudi citizenship, regardless of what those rights 
and obligations consist in. In this sense, it may appropriate to state that no further informa-
tion about specific rights and duties that could be attributed to Sophia has been published. 
This development raised several issues125 with respect to the legal framework applicable 
to Sophia. Overall, the case was considered to be a publicity stunt, especially after Saudi 
Arabia announced being open to digital transformation.126
Although AI/robots may already have many features similar to human beings, such as 
the ability to communicate, knowledge with respect to itself and the external world as 
well as some level of creativity, as demonstrated by Sophia, it does not seem reasonable to 
equate them to an individual. This is because a human being behind the AI/robot could 
always “pull the plug” and deactivate such technology (unless judgement day has arrived 
and machines take over and start “pulling the plug” on humans as seen in the movie 
Terminator). Therefore, the only reasonable proposition would be to grant them a legal 
personality similar to legal entities (such as corporations). However, treating them as legal 
entities (corporations) would entail the creation of a “robotics law” (similar to company 
law) which would be responsible for governing such legal subjects (e.g. creation, capability 
of holding rights, assets incurring liabilities and expenses and so on). Moreover, changes 
will need to be made to other fields of law such as contract or commercial law, which would 
govern the commercial transactions entered into by such legal subjects. Also, it should be 
noted that companies are common forms through which individuals do business. It does 
not make any sense to set up “robotics law”, as individuals cannot do business through 
such technology. At most, they can benefit from such technology. Given that a considerable 
amount of change will be required to the existing legal system, granting them legal per-
sonality seems a herculean task. Furthermore, to put it across bluntly, people who own or 
govern corporations and corporations employ people. It is hard to imagine AI/robots owing 
or governing corporations or AI/robots employing people themselves. Also, in the “real 
world”, it is difficult to imagine at present AI/robots employing other AI/robots. 
Additionally, the recognition of legal personality does not grant tax capacity, unless robots 
are identified and considered as taxable subjects and subject to fair and equitable taxation.127 
123. Hanson Robotics, Sophia, available at https://www.hansonrobotics.com/sophia/. See Sophia’s interaction 
with the author and life coach Tony Robbins, with an emphasis on “her” cognitive ability, available at 
https://youtu.be/Sq36J9pNaEo. 
124. O. Cuthbert, Saudi Arabia Becomes First Country to Grant Citizenship to a Robot, Arab News 
(26 Oct. 2017), available at https://www.arabnews.com/node/1183166/saudi-arabia.
125. R.D. Hart. Saudi Arabia’s Robot Citizen is Eroding Human Rights, Quartz (14 Feb. 2018), available at 
https://qz.com/1205017/saudi-arabias-robot-citizen-is-eroding-human-rights/.
126. BBC News, Saudi Arabia to Lift Ban on Internet Calls (20 Sept. 2017), available at https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-41332743.
127. Oberson, supra n. 85, at p. 21.
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If we assume that AI/robots can be defined128 for tax law purposes (for example, based on 
the aforementioned hypothetical “robotics law”, which would be extremely difficult to 
design), the question is whether AI/robots have tax capacity. Two principles will be dis-
cussed here, that is, the benefit principle as well as the ability to pay principle.
It is quite obvious that AI/robots personally will not benefit from services financed by the 
state, among which education, health services, retirement, sick leave, social benefits and 
so forth. Neither will they personally benefit from public infrastructures such as roads, 
highways and so on. Moreover, they independently will not benefit from a state’s legal 
framework. On a lighter note, Robert Atkinson asks “… If the robot is paying social security 
taxes, could it retire after 40 years and collect social security? If the robot breaks, does it get 
disability pay?”.129 It could be argued that corporations also do not benefit from the above 
infrastructure. However, there are a few differences here. Corporations benefit from a state’s 
legal framework. Also, the people they employ benefit from the state’s public infrastructure. 
Unless and until an appropriate legal framework is developed to govern and regulate AI/
robots, it seems taxation of such technology as an independent taxable person conflicts with 
the benefit principle. Assuming a legal framework is developed, a state could be justified to 
charge a fee vis-à-vis this framework. This fee would work as the price paid in exchange for 
a public service such as toll fees or the taxes paid for the use of a public infrastructure, as 
occurs with airports. This kind of fee needs to have a direct link with the service covered by 
the state. According to Prof. Oberson,130 by applying such a concept to robots, the govern-
ment could charge a fee “as a compensation for specific surveillance, certification or public 
infrastructures installed for the use or control of robots”. However, since the tax design 
only covers the cost of the provision of the service, it would not cover the possible deficit 
that uncollected payroll-based taxes would leave. Also, it would not cover the effect that 
robots may possibly cause on the labour market.131 Even if a state manages to develop legal 
infrastructure to govern AI/robots, then the natural question is whether AI/robots have the 
capacity to pay any fees/taxes to the state. 
In this regard, it is also quite obvious that AI/robots will not have the ability to pay their 
own taxes (lack of financial capacity). The ability to pay will only be present when they can 
make income/profits. As discussed previously in this section, unless and until AI/robots are 
allocated a separate legal personality, as well as financial capacity, with the effect that they 
can engage in commercial transactions and make profits, one would have to be quite oblivi-
ous to assume that they can pay their fair share of taxes. In this regard, Prof. Englisch states 
that “robots without an autonomously defined personal spending capacity could not even 
theoretically bear the intended income tax burden; instead, the incidence of the income tax 
would always fall on someone else (most likely primarily on their owner). Accordingly, as 
128. With respect to this issue, Dr Falcão asks: “Is a robot a tangible asset? Can it be a process? Is a robot an 
asset capable of executing an action that would typically be executed by a human (is the definition of a 
robot intrinsically connected to its ability to perform human jobs), or is a robot also a process that can 
outperform human beings?”. Falcão, supra n. 72. Moreover, Sam Mitha affirms that “given the range and 
sophistication of robots likely to come into development, the definition needs to be ‘form neutral’; i.e. 
it should include all autonomous robots, bots and similar smart AI machines. Any proposed definition 
should be tested from not just from legal perspectives, but also from economic, technological and consti-
tutional approaches”. Mitha, supra n. 107.
129. Atkinson, supra n. 50, at p. 7. 
130. Oberson, supra n. 85, at p. 130.
131. Barros, supra n. 54, at pp. 10-11.
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long as robots do not have self-defined personal needs, making them liable to pay income 
tax cannot be justified on grounds of the ability to pay principle”.132
Assuming that all the foregoing challenges can be overcome, one option is to treat AI/robots 
as individuals. However, as discussed previously, AI/robots are not comparable to human 
beings. In fact, the latter can “pull the plug” on the former. Thus, we will not venture into 
a discussion on treating AI/robots as deemed human beings and attributing income (e.g. 
deemed employment income) to them, as that concept is flawed in its entirety. 
As a result, the only viable option is to treat them as taxable legal entity type subjects. 
However, our opinion is that AI/robots cannot be comparable to legal entities such as cor-
porations. On the one hand, corporations are legal fictions created by commercial law and 
as a result they have to adhere to minimum capital requirements upon creation, ongoing 
requirements with respect to its functioning such as bookkeeping, board meetings, share-
holding reporting and so forth. It is hard to imagine the development of similar require-
ments for AI/robots, for example, an autonomous vehicle. On the other hand, corporations 
are not autonomous like certain types of AI/robots. Corporations are always driven by 
individuals. Thus, venturing into developing a regime for AI/robots on the assumption that 
they are similar to legal entities is simply erroneous. 
Assuming they are treated as separate legal subjects, several issues arise, and to keep this 
article within manageable proportions, the authors will analyse only a few selected issues. 
Considering that they are treated as opaque taxable subjects for direct corporate tax pur-
poses, an initial question is how do you define “residency of such legal subjects”? Is it their 
place of registration or place of use or place of business? Can they trigger dual residence 
issues? The second question is, what are the taxable objects of this legal construction? In 
other words, will AI/robots receive active business income? How do you determine this 
income? For example, let us assume that Company X owns an autonomous vehicle Y. The 
vehicle is used to offer rides to customers (individuals). The income generated from such a 
vehicle, under current rules, is attributed to Company X. The proponents of this tax now 
argue that the income should belong to Y, but does this make sense? This could undoubtedly 
lead to economic double taxation when the owner is also taxed on the income derived by 
the AI/robots. Appropriate rules for avoiding such economic double taxation will need to be 
built in, which adds to the layer of complexity. Third, what is the taxable base of AI/robots? 
Are they entitled to any deductions? In this regard, Prof. Oberson133 argues that AI/robots 
should be taxed on a gross revenue basis. The question is: how will this gross revenue be 
determined in a situation where Y spends 50% of its running time on providing services to 
customers and the balance time driving managers of Company X? Will the remuneration 
of this 50% (for self-usage time) be determined by using the arm’s length standard, that is, 
carrying out a transfer pricing analysis?134 Also, if AI/robots are allocated financial capacity, 
should they not pay taxes on a net basis? Deemed costs, in the example given, could include 
costs for paying registration fees to the state department that manages the “robotics law”, 
hiring other AI/robots, car fuel expenses, etc. Fourth, what is the tax rate of this legal con-
struction? Is it the same as corporate tax? Moreover, economic double taxation issues could 
arise if corporate tax is levied at the level of the AI/robot (Y) as well as the business that uses 
132. Englisch, supra n. 115, at p. 4. 
133. Oberson, supra n. 85, at p. 133.
134. Id., at p. 115. 
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them (Company X). How will these issues be mitigated? Lastly, the cross-border dimension 
will need to be considered. Can AI/robots access tax treaties? How will you determine their 
residence? How will you deal with dual residence? Which distributive rule will cover their 
income and so on? These are indeed challenging questions that will require a significant 
change to the current system.135 While answers could be found to all these questions,136 nat-
urally, such changes will make the legislation complex and enhance tax uncertainty. So, the 
question is: do we really want to go down this path and make tax law much more difficult 
to understand and implement?
With respect to the discussion on treating AI/robots as independent taxable persons for 
VAT purposes, once again, to keep this article within manageable proportions, the authors 
will only discuss a few issues. First, can AI/robots be taxable persons? According to the EU 
VAT Directive137 (article 9), such persons can be “any person who, independently, carries 
out in any place any economic activity, whatever the purpose or results of that activity”. The 
issue here is with the term “independently”. To what extent can an AI/robot that, for now, 
has some human control behind it, be considered independent? It is definitely necessary to 
develop this concept for VAT purposes. Arguably, if we allocate separate legal and tax per-
sonality then this step can be overcome. But this would not be enough, as sufficient financial 
capacity (funds) will need to be allocated to the AI/robots. Second, what are the taxable 
objects? Let us go back to our example on autonomous vehicles discussed before. Under the 
current rules, Company X is considered to provide a taxable service. The proponents of this 
tax now argue that the service should be attributed to Y and Y shall charge VAT. This is 
clearly a case of double taxation. Also, will Y be allowed to claim input VAT? How will this 
be done? How will all these issues be solved? The proponents of this proposal also argue that 
blockchain technology can be used to streamline input and output VAT that is applicable to 
AI/robots.138 In this regard, it seems that blockchain technology’s “use case” is overstated in 
indirect tax matters as this technology has many challenges. Dr Bal states 
every emerging technology goes through a hype stage, and then people start questioning wheth-
er it will withstand the test of time. Despite being in existence for over 10 years, blockchain tech-
nology still has not been widely adopted. Blockchain would solve problems such as fragmented 
information systems, limited supply chain visibility, and the need for real-time data traceability 
that are commonly encountered in the VAT system. However, in the author’s opinion, there are 
still serious limitations to the widespread adoption of blockchain technology in the VAT sector, 
the most important of which are the cost and effort needed to implement the system and the 
lack of the requisite supporting innovation ecosystem. The technology itself also poses several 
challenges that are yet to be resolved. Finally, there are many regulatory difficulties — issues that 
are just as important to overcome as the technological ones.139 
To summarize, the proposal does not seem feasible at all.140
Accordingly, taxing AI/robots as separate taxable subjects leads to several complications 
from a direct or indirect tax perspective, in particular, defining and allocating legal/tax 
135. Id., at p. 149-155. The author highlights these issues but does not give sufficient answers. 
136. For an answer to a few questions, see also Carvalho, supra n. 122, at pp. 440-443. However, due to the use 
of subjective terminology, the proposals of this author could trigger substantial tax uncertainty. 
137. EU: Council Directive 2006/112/EC (28 Nov. 2006), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32006L0112.
138. Oberson, supra n. 85, at p. 135. 
139. A. Bal, Between Hype and Disillusionment: Will a VAT Blockchain Ever Be Possible in the EU?, Tax Notes 
International, p. 902 (24 Feb. 2020). 
140. Barros, supra n. 54, at pp. 8-9.
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personality as well as determining residency, taxable object streams, taxable base and so on, 
in particular, defining and allocating legal/tax personality as well as determining residency, 
taxable object streams, taxable base, etc. 
The measures targeting the use of AI/robots (see section 4.2.2.) will need to define AI/robots 
in a general manner or will require differentiating between AI/robots that could comple-
ment humans or AI/robots that could substitute humans. As discussed previously in this 
section, this is indeed a challenging task.141 Moreover, several proposals may require rules 
to calculate the taxable value linked to AI/robots or rules to identify levels of automation. 
For example, the introduction of a robot usage tax, that is, attributing a deemed income 
to the owner (see section 4.2.2.1.) relies on allocating an arm’s length salary remuneration 
to the owner for the usage of the AI/robot.142 That said, determining the salary, neverthe-
less, is difficult, taking into account that AI/robots can replace combined functions.143 
Additionally, in some cases, AI/robots can work together with humans or other robots and, 
in such a case, a functional analysis, similar to what is done when carrying out a transfer 
pricing analysis will need to be undertaken to determine the taxable activities and taxable 
income that should be attributable.144 Moreover, the proposal would involve looking into 
comparable salaries available in the public domain. It could be extremely difficult to find 
such comparables,145 and when available, reasonably accurate adjustments will need to 
be made. We all know that using the arm’s length principle to allocate profits to various 
establishments in a multinational enterprise is a challenging task, in particular performing 
a functional and comparability analysis.146 Also, disputes with respect to the arm’s length 
principle are increasing all over the world. Thus, it would not make any sense going down 
the “arm’s length” path, which provides for subjective outcomes.147 Professor Mazur argues 
that such a tax would be unworkable in practice.148 Additionally, these rules lead to econom-
ic double taxation, and an appropriate framework will need to be developed to deal with 
resolving these matters, which would once again add to the level of complexity. 
For similar reasons, introducing an object tax on AI/robots at the level of the owner (see 
section 4.2.2.2.) would be tedious, as it would be difficult to estimate their fair market values 
on an annual basis (for example, an autonomous car). Moreover, considering that some of 
the robots only have the artificial intelligence without having a physical body (chatbot, for 
instance, usually used for customer service), it would be difficult to implement this type 
141. Mazur, supra n. 54, at p. 299.
142. Englisch, supra n. 115, at p. 20.
143. Barros, supra n. 54, at p. 8.
144. Oberson, supra n. 85, at p. 115. 
145. IMF, OECD, UN and WBG, The Platform for Collaboration on Tax – A Toolkit for Addressing Difficulties 
in Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing Analyses (Apr. 2017), available at https://www.oecd.
org/tax/toolkit-on-comparability-and-mineral-pricing.pdf.
146. R. Avi-Yonah, Formulary Apportionment – Myths and Prospects: Promoting Better International Tax 
Policies by Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative, 3 World Tax J. 3, 
p. 377 (2011), Journal Articles & Papers IBFD. See also X. Oberson, Taxing Robots? From the Emergence 
of an Electronic Ability to Pay to a Tax on Robots or the Use of Robots, 9 World Tax J. 2 (2017), Journal 
Articles & Papers IBFD. 
147. In this regard, see V. Chand, A. Turina & L. Ballivet, Profit Allocation within MNEs in Light of the Ongoing 
Digital Debate on Pillar I – A “2020 Compromise”?: From Using A Facts and Circumstances Analysis or 
Allocation Keys to Predetermined Allocation Approaches, 12 World Tax J. 3 (2020), Journal Articles & 
Papers IBFD. 
148. Mazur, supra n. 54, at pp. 301-302.
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of wealth or object tax apart from, again, how to delimit this concept for law and taxation 
purposes.149
Measures that restrict deductions could also be complex (and require anti-avoidance 
rules150). Consider the Korean example (see section 4.2.2.3.). Dimitropoulou indicates that 
this regime was full of complexity as the proposals scope was not well-defined, i.e. invest-
ments in technological equipment that would qualify for a tax credit and investments in 
technological equipment that would not qualify for such an incentive.151 Moreover, any 
proposal that would require definitions of AI/robots that are close substitutes to the human 
workforce, and AI/robots that are complementary to the human workforce, will be inher-
ently complex, as defining such boundaries is indeed a challenging task for policymakers.152 
Some challenges might complicate the implementation of the higher corporate tax rates for 
automatized businesses apart from being non-neutral (see section 4.2.2.3.2.). For example, 
when should a business be classified as an “automated business” or not? Will a business be 
an automated business if it replaces 5% of the human workforce, 10% of the workforce, 20% 
of the workforce or more than half of the workforce? How will these percentages be mea-
sured? These questions add complexity to the proposal. 
Automation-related taxes (see section 4.2.2.3.3.), depending on their design, could also be 
complex to implement. For instance, if the ratios pegged to such taxes are subjective and not 
well-defined, then tax uncertainty rises.153 Moreover, as the ratios are linked to the ratio of 
the workforce to sales or profits, the approach effectively penalizes all businesses (not only 
automated businesses) that have high income and low headcounts.154 In addition, if the tax 
is pegged to employees or revenue ratios, several companies in the retail sector would be 
impacted negatively as they have high amounts of revenue but low profit margins. Overall, 
such taxes clearly stunt productivity and innovation. Granting tax incentives for employ-
ing humans instead of machines by exempting social security contributions may break the 
social security system. Such incentives would also not be consistent with the underlying 
idea of solving the problem of reduced tax revenues.155
Finally, targeted VAT measures (see section 4.2.2.4.) wherein businesses need to separately 
estimate the value added by robots could create complexity156 and negatively impact invest-
ments in view of the effect of double or multiple taxation. As Sam Mitha states, “it would 
be highly complex, costly and unpopular with businesses. It would also conflict with the 
government’s unstated objective of maintaining the continuity and congruency of the VAT 
regime with that in the EU”.157 
Efficiency aspects (compliance costs)
Moving to efficiency aspects (compliance costs), as discussed above, all proposals that are 
dependent on (i) defining AI/robots; or (ii) defining AI/robots that substitute human labour 
149. Barros, supra n. 54, at p. 10.
150. Id., at p. 13.
151. See also Dimitropoulou, supra n. 97, at sec. 3.1.2. 
152. Mazur, supra n. 54, at p. 302.
153. W. Meisel, The Software Society: Cultural and Economic Impact pp. 220-221 (Trafford Publishing 2014).
154. Mazur, supra n. 54, at p. 303; and Atkinson, supra n. 50, at pp. 16-17.
155. Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra n. 94, at p. 171.
156. Barros, supra n. 54, at p. 13.
157. Mitha, supra n. 107.
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and those that do not; and (iii) require calculations of value linked to robots will enhance 
complexity, thereby increasing tax uncertainty and ultimately resulting in tax disputes.158 
The cost of complying with such taxes will undoubtedly be high for taxpayers (especially 
companies) as well as tax administrations, as “these proposals involve substantial elements 
of arbitrariness and … unjustified line-drawing”.159 Given the complexity, the adoption of 
such measures is to be discouraged.160
Effectiveness and fairness considerations
First, from an effectiveness standpoint, the authors believe that proposals that are depen-
dent on defining AI/robots would lead to a compliance nightmare and even if this hurdle 
is overcome, governments will find it extremely difficult to enforce the collection of such 
taxes. For example, if more than 10 million self-driven autonomous vehicles enter into the 
market (e.g. US market) then, under the proposals that deal with taxing AI/robots as inde-
pendent taxable subjects or deeming a notional salary in the hands of the owner, we would 
have to assess taxes with respect to 10 million new taxpayers. In this regard, it could well 
be possible that owners would be tempted to not disclose the ownership of AI/robots on 
their tax return. Also, it could be difficult for the tax administration to carry out an audit 
to understand whether or not a taxpayer uses AI/robots or whether or not an AI/robot is 
autonomous. Thus, tax collection and control could be a challenge. 
Second, from a fairness standpoint, the above proposals could trigger profit shifting as they 
hamper innovation (discussed subsequently).161 It is obvious to the authors that if a state 
introduces the foregoing proposals (on a unilateral basis), then corporate taxpayers would 
be tempted to move their activities to another location that does not introduce such mea-
sures. For example, if tax incentives in R&D in automation are penalized or scaled back, 
then the taxpayer will simply move its activities to a jurisdiction that is ready to provide it 
with input or output incentives. Moreover, if a high-net-worth individual uses several AI/
robots and if that individual would be required to pay taxes on deemed employment income 
attributed to the AI/robots, then that individual could contemplate moving to another 
jurisdiction wherein they are not subject to such taxes and compliance requirements. But 
this phenomenon is not new. As long as taxes are levied on mobile taxpayers (individuals or 
companies), profit shifting will continue to exist. 
Flexibility 
Last, the proposals could also breach the principle of flexibility.162 First, the tax loss issues 
triggered by AI/robots, at this stage, seem a probable but not an actual concern. Thus, there 
is no need to introduce taxes on such innovations. Second, as discussed above, most of the 
proposals will require defining AI/robots. A narrow definition could lead to the legislation 
being inflexible when taking into account future developments, whereas with a broad defi-
nition it could well be possible that a vacuum cleaner, which people have at home, could also 
be classified as a robot. Third, some proposals on taxing AI/robots could lead to tax evasion 
(due to non-compliance) and possibly profit shifting. Fourth, some of the proposals apply 
only to selected situations or to selected businesses. It could well be possible that in the near 
158. Barros, supra n. 54, at pp. 15-16.
159. Mazur, supra n. 54, at p. 303.
160. Barros, supra n. 54, at p. 18.
161. Mazur, supra n. 54, at pp. 300-301.
162. OECD, supra n. 78, at p. 10; and Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 78, at p. 20. 
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future, all individuals/all businesses could use AI/robots to a certain extent and benefit 
from them. Accordingly, designing AI/robot-related taxes only for selected situations would 
lead to the outcome that the system for taxation is neither flexible nor dynamic. 
4.4.  Concluding remarks from an innovation perspective 
In light of the discussion above, it does not come as a surprise that several states have 
rejected the idea of a tax on AI/Robots. The UK Parliament rejected the idea of imposing 
robot taxes.163 It states: “in his evidence to us, the Minister indicated that the Government 
too found the idea of a robot tax in current automation environment as ‘perverse’. We need 
more robots and not fewer. A tax on them would further discourage take up. We do not 
believe that a tax on robots is in the interest of businesses or workers in the UK”.164 A sim-
ilar conclusion was reached in Switzerland.165 A statement from the Swiss Federal Council 
(English translation) declares “the report issued by the Federal Council on 11 January 2017 
on the main framework conditions concerning the digital economy, which analyses the 
situation in the context of the Digital Switzerland Strategy, does not foresee any immediate 
need to fundamentally revise the social and fiscal systems in force. In addition, current 
knowledge does not allow us to anticipate a negative effect of the digitization of the econo-
my on employment”.166 In 2017, the European Union in turn rejected the adoption of robot 
taxation.167
Moreover, in light of the BEPS initiative, in particular BEPS Action 5, many governments 
have introduced input and output-related tax incentives (IP boxes) for promoting R&D.168 
AI (technology) would typically fall under the category of qualifying IP assets.169 Thus, 
imposing taxes on such assets would be contrary to the R&D policy of many states. They 
could then be considered to hamper innovation.170 On this issue, the UK Parliament, by 
comparing its own tax system with Japan’s system for taxing AI/robots, indeed stated “we 
163. UK Parliament, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, Businesses Face Being Left Behind by 
Transition to New Technologies (18 Sept. 2019), available at https://www.parliament.uk/business/commit 
tees/committees-a-z/commons-select/business-energy-industrial-strategy/news-parliament-2017/auto 
mation-and-future-of-work-report-published-17-19/.
164. UK Parliament, Parliamentary Business, Automation and the Industrial Strategy, para. 41 (18 Sept. 2019), 
available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmbeis/1093/109307.htm#_idText 
Anchor020.
165. In December 2018, the Swiss Federal Council considered taxation of AI/robots as unnecessary. U. Lomas, 
Swiss ‘Robot Taxes’ Deemed Unnecessary, Wolters Kluwer (21 Dec. 2018), available at https://www.tax-
news.com/news/Swiss_Robot_Taxes_Deemed_Unnecessary____96985.html. 
166. The original text can be found in French : “Le rapport du Conseil fédéral du 11 janvier 2017 sur les prin-
cipales conditions-cadres pour l’économie numérique, qui dresse un état des lieux dans le cadre de la 
Stratégie Suisse numérique, ne prévoit aucun besoin immédiat de réviser fondamentalement les systèmes 
social et fiscal en vigueur. De plus, les connaissances actuelles ne permettent pas d’anticiper un effet négatif 
de la numérisation de l’économie sur l’emploi total”. R. Mathias, Evaluer l' impact des Robots sur le Système 
des Assurances Sociales, The Federal Assembly — The Swiss Parliament (1 Mar. 2017), available at https://
www.parlament.ch/en/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20173037. 
167. EU Resolution of 16 February 2017, supra n. 120.
168. For further information on the status of IP regimes, see OECD, Harmful Tax Practices – 2018 
Progress Report on Preferential Regimes (OECD 2018), available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
docserver/9789264311480-en.pdf?expires=1590739448&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=B9B32E7B6 
F77E13549E637DBC877B04E. 
169. For further information on the definition of an IP asset, OECD/G20, Countering Harmful Tax Practices 
More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance – Action 5: 2015 Final Report paras. 34-37 
(OECD 2015), available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241190-en.pdf?expires= 
1590739675&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=1D93F557DDD62C86D3A5B435C5E5FBF1. 
170. Mazur, supra n. 54, at pp. 299-300.
World Tax Journal November 2020 | 744
Vikram Chand, Svetislav Kostić and Ariene Reis 
© IBFD
recommend that the Government brings forward proposals  in the next budget for a new 
tax incentive designed  to encourage investment in new technology, such as automation 
and robotics”.171 
With respect to encouraging investments, Italy’s 2020 Budget (Law no. 160 of 27 December 
2019)172 introduced a tax credit ranging from 6% to 40% – which is equivalent to a cash 
grant – that can be enjoyed by investing in Industry 4.0 assets. For example, investments 
in machinery and other equipment that are controlled by computer systems and/or oper-
ated by smart sensors or drivers and drives linked to the computer system of an industry 
or factory. Taxpayers can also offset such credit with some other tax debts/liabilities. 
There are some requirements to classify an asset as a “Industry 4.0” asset. The Law at issue 
entered into force on 1 January 2020 and replaces the previous provisions known as hyper 
or super-depreciation.173 
Similarly, Poland has announced its intention to encourage investments in robots from 
1 January 2021 onwards. The idea is to provide a tax relief that would allow both individuals 
and companies (regardless of sector or size) additionally to deduct 50% of costs relating to 
this type of investment. This measure will also encompass costs regarding leasing robots, 
the acquisition of software required to operate such robots and staff training.174
One can also note that perhaps the proposals to provide AI/robots with separate tax person-
ality or to install on them specific taxes still leave us with an unanswered question of what 
would be the justification for such innovations. Namely, as all technology makes human 
labour unnecessary, relying on such a logic we could call for a tax on all technology that 
lowers the need for the involvement of people. Would this also encompass taxing all tech-
nology based on e.g. the wheel or the leverage mechanism, as these have for millennia made 
human work superfluous. In other words, apart from flashy details, what is the fundamental 
difference between the wheel and a robot?
If AI/robots were to fundamentally alter our behaviour in a way as to make the majority of 
the world’s population docile, not by choice but simply due to lack of gainful employment, 
then it would not suffice just to amend our fiscal policies. In such circumstances, the world 
would need to find completely new social, economic and only then fiscal paradigms. In 
order to illustrate the depth of such a change in the simplest terms, the authors can suggest 
that the very concept of money and remuneration would need to be replaced as the majority 
of those in need of goods and services would have no means of offering anything tangible 
in exchange for them. Furthermore, in the absence of a market, our very understanding of 
capital would need to change. In such circumstances, taxation itself may become an obso-
lete concept.
On the other hand, if AI/robots are just another step in our development saga, tools that will 
help us surmount future obstacles (climate change, aging of the population and the global 
171. UK Parliament, supra n. 164, at para. 44. 
172. IT: Italy’s 2020 Budget (Law no. 160 of 27 Dec. 2019), available at https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/
gu/2019/12/30/304/so/45/sg/pdf. 
173. Deloitte, 2020 Budget Law Enacted, Related Law Decree Converted into Law, Tax@hand (13 Jan. 2020), 
available at https://www.taxathand.com/article/12765/Italy/2020/2020-budget-law-enacted-related-law-
decree-converted-into-law. 
174. A. Bal, Does a Robot Deserve Tax Relief?, Tax & Technology Expert (2020), available at https://tax- 
technology.expert/Technology/article160920.html.
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demographic decline, space exploration, etc.), then our attention should not be focused on 
trying to fiscally target novel material objects (i.e. robots), but we should attempt to under-
stand the social trends with whom they may be related. 
5.  Our Recommendation: Earmarked Education Taxes 
5.1.  Overview
At this stage, due to the different opinions on the impact of AI/robots on employment (as 
outlined in section 3.), that authors share the view expressed by the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland, as well as some scholars,175 that taxes on AI/robots should not be introduced. 
Only as time goes by, will it be possible to tell how this Fourth Industrial Revolution will 
play itself out, that is, whether employment levels of human beings will reduce (temporarily 
or more permanently) or increase (temporarily or more permanently).
That said, it is important to keep in mind that taxes are not an appropriate tool to reduce 
automation levels (and preserve existing jobs).176 To draw a parallel, the same way that 
taxing cigarettes does not prevent people from smoking.177 Levying tax is not always an 
effective measure to dissuade a given behaviour.
One of the most important policy objectives over the next few years is that policymakers 
make their best efforts to ensure that the Fourth Industrial Revolution benefits as much 
people as possible. On the one hand, their aim should be to accommodate and encourage 
progress that promotes economic value whereas on the other hand, they should aim at 
redistributing benefits and advantages to the ones negatively impacted (if that happens).
One of the main challenges (among other global challenges) for states would be to find the 
most appropriate balance between designing taxes around AI/robots and technological 
development and innovation. The design needs to be made in a manner that the former 
does not completely or considerably eliminate the latter.178 Moreover, it should be taken 
into consideration that technology is progressing exponentially and “what is yet to come” is 
unknown. It may well be possible that “high-tech” and “high employment” do not need to 
be exclusive – they can actually coexist.179 
Keeping the foregoing in mind, the authors believe that policymakers need to be “proactive” 
rather than being “reactive”. Government will need to monitor the evolution of the impact 
of AI/robots on tax revenues. If reliable economic data starts pointing out that unemploy-
ment levels are increasing due to automation (and not other events, for example, COVID-
19180), then governments should focus on reskilling workers by providing appropriate edu-
175. Mazur, supra n. 54, at p. 303; and Atkinson, supra n. 50, at pp. 1-19.
176. P. Ericksen, A Robot Tax is a Very Bad Idea, Technology and IIOT (20 Sept. 2019), available at https://
www.industryweek.com/technology-and-iiot/article/22028269/a-robot-tax-is-a-very-bad-idea. 
177. K. Callison & R. Kaestner, Do Higher Tobacco Taxes Reduce Adult Smoking? New Evidence of the Effect 
of Recent Cigarette Tax Increases on Adult Smoking, National Bureau of Economic Research (Aug. 2012), 
available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w18326#:~:text=There%20is%20a%20general%20consensus, 
adult%20smoking%20is%20relatively%20sparse. 
178. Barros, supra n. 54, at p. 14.
179. University of Arkansas, Machines and People Can Coexist, Work Together More Productively (15 Aug. 
2012), available at https://phys.org/news/2012-08-machines-people-coexist-productively.html. 
180. D. Bloom & K. Prettner, The Macroeconomic Effects of Automation and the Role of COVID-19 in Reinforcing 
Their Dynamics, Vox EU (25 June 2020), available at https://voxeu.org/article/covid-19-and-macroeco 
nomic-effects-automation. 
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cation instead of funding support schemes that entail handing out minimum wages.181 This 
is because “for every robot we put in the world, you have to have someone maintaining it 
or servicing it or taking care of it”.182 One may raise the question “why not create a national 
skills centre, which would anticipate/shape the needs of the market in terms of skills and 
help with a programmed reorientation before obsolescence? Or introduce a ‘skills insur-
ance’, which would help finance career reorientation?”.183 
By doing so, the chances of people being employed increases. Thus, by empowering indi-
viduals and putting them back on the job market, governments can expect taxes from such 
personnel (payroll taxes, income taxes or consumption taxes). Towards this end, policy-
makers could, as a start, identify the existing “jobs” which could be automated and already 
reskill the people working in these jobs. It is not the purpose of this contribution to discuss 
what “new” skills will look like, but sufficient information seems to be available in the public 
181. The most popular proposal is the universal basic income (UBI) scheme. The scheme is based on the idea 
of “an income paid by a political community to all its members on an individual basis, without means 
test or work requirement”. See P.V. Parijs, Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-
First Century, p. 8 (2004), available at https://www.onlabor.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Chap1.
Simple_and_Powerful.pdf. In this regard, governments would regularly pay an income to individuals 
regardless of their employment status, income earned or wealth held with the aim of providing social 
protection. Its advocates defend such schemes by arguing that it would encourage further education, 
the search for better jobs and also entrepreneurship (self-employment). See M. Moody-Stuart, Universal 
Basic Income is Best Response to Automation, Financial Times (10 May 2019), available at https://www.
ft.com/content/5f931514-e46e-11e9-b112-9624ec9edc59. The adoption of UBI to help society has been 
supported by many economists. See F. Coppola, Top Economists Endorse Universal Basic Income, Forbes 
(31 Aug. 2017), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2017/08/31/top-economists- 
endorse-universal-basic-income/#4502a05915ae; and A. Lago, Is Universal Basic Income the Answer to 
Automation?, Medium (12 Sept. 2020), available at https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/is-univer 
sal-basic-income-the-answer-to-automation-43d1f7e75d5c. In contrast, nobel prize-winning economist 
Paul Krugman has expressed his concerns regarding UBI, since the cost for governments would be high 
and the amounts paid to people could be inadequate. See J. Malter & K. Sprague, Why Paul Krugman Is 
“not a UBI Guy”, CNBC (23 Apr. 2019), available at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/23/paul-krugman-
on-universal-basic-income-im-not-a-ubi-guy.html. Moreover, Daniel Susskind, who played an important 
role during the Blair and Cameron governments, affirms that people could get the wrong idea about the 
incentive and feel offended about receiving something without any consideration in return. Therefore, he 
defends the implementation of some conditions with the scheme, such as voluntary work. See I. Tucker, 
Daniel Susskind: ‘Automation of Jobs is One of the Greatest Questions of our Time’, The Economist (18 Jan. 
2020), available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/18/automation-jobs-universal- 
basic-income-daniel-susskind-interview. Although this proposal has several supporters, it should be 
noted that UBI seems not to be a feasible solution for the potential unemployment caused by the imple-
mentation of AI/robots. First, despite the fact that it is a minimum income, it could discourage the search 
for work; or being paid by the government for a long period could make the re-entry of the worker into the 
market more difficult. If nothing is done in terms of reskilling, there is a high chance of the worker being 
stuck on basic income permanently. Besides, the UBI payment will not solve the problem of inequality 
– high-skilled people would keep playing important roles in the economy while the UBI receivers, if not 
reskilled, will possibly not fit in society.
182. J. Pistrui, The Future of Human Work Is Imagination, Creativity, and Strategy, Ascend Harvard Business 
Review (4 Dec. 2019), available at https://hbrascend.org/topics/the-future-of-human-work-is-imagina 
tion-creativity-and-strategy/?utm_source=HBR_LinkedIn&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign= 
HBR_post. 
183. Unil, Le Temps – Isabelle Chappuis, Director of Futures Lab: “The Accounting Profession Can Be 
Performed at 67% by a Robot.”, Futures Lab, HEC Lausanne (15 July 2020), available at https://wp.unil.ch/
futureslab/2020/07/le-temps-isabelle-chappuis-director-of-futures-lab-the-accounting-profession-can-
be-performed-at-67-by-a-robot/?lang=en. 
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domain,184,185 especially, suggestions to enhance digital literacy or skills.186 In this regard, as 
an example, it should be noted that the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) 
has created the EPFL Extension School to teach new digital skills to individuals without 
university qualifications.187 The question that arises then is how do states fund these educa-
tion programmes so that individuals can follow them? 
5.2.  Education taxes: Lessons from selected countries 
According to data collected by the OECD from its members, the largest part of governments’ 
revenues earmarked towards education is allocated for primary and secondary education 
levels (69% of all education expenditure).188 This statistic could possibly (not definitely) indi-
cate that public sources, which may be needed to mitigate high levels of unemployment in 
the future due to automation, are not targeted towards higher and professional education. 
Thus, additional resources may be required. 
An easier solution, in comparison to the previous targeted ones, would be the creation of a 
dedicated fund to finance education or awareness programmes for planetary issues, which 
are not restricted to the borders of a given jurisdiction (as discussed in section 3.2.). In 
an AI/robots context, which would be a part of a wider setting, this proposal makes more 
sense when considering the main rationale for implementing taxes around AI/robots is to 
compensate for the replacement of humans by machines. 
In fact, some countries already collect taxes for education. The Indian Constitution, for 
example, provides in article 270(1)189 that the government is allowed to collect a tax called 
“cess” for generating revenue for specific purposes. By relying on such a provision, the 
Indian government, via Finance Act 2004,190 introduced an education cess at 2% to support 
the provision of basic education. To meet the needs of secondary and higher education, this 
cess was increased, in 2007, to 3%. In 2018, the Government replaced it with a health and 
education cess at 4%. The cess is payable by all taxpayers (individuals or companies or other 
legal forms, subject to certain conditions). Such cess is levied as a percentage on all direct 
taxes (such as corporate and individual income tax) as well as indirect taxes such as customs 
184. J. Stillman, 21 Future Jobs the Robots Are Actually Creating, Inc. (6 Dec. 2017), available at https://www.
inc.com/jessica-stillman/21-future-jobs-robots-are-actually-creating.html.
185. T. Allas et al., The Future of Work, McKinsey & Company (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.mckinsey.
com/featured-insights/future-of-work/the-future-of-work-rethinking-skills-to-tackle-the-uks-looming-
talent-shortage.
186. See also Dimitropoulou, supra n. 97, at sec. 5. 
187. Unil, supra n. 19. See also https://www.extensionschool.ch/ 
188. OECD, Education at a Glance 2019: OECD Indicators (OECD 2019), available at https://doi.org/10.1787/
f8d7880d-en. 
189. Art. 270: “(1). All taxes and duties referred to in the Union List, except the duties and taxes referred to in 
articles 268, 269 and 269A respectively, surcharge on taxes and duties referred to in article 271 and any 
cess levied for specific purposes under any law made by Parliament shall be levied and collected by the 
Government of India and shall be distributed between the Union and the States in the manner provided 
in clause (2).” IN: Indian Constitution, available at https://www.cbic.gov.in/resources//htdocs-cbec/gst/
consti-amend-bill-122-2014-new.pdf.
190. Sec. 91 Finance Act 2004 establishes that “there shall be levied […] as surcharge for the purposes of the 
Union, a cess to be called the education cess, to fulfil the commitment of the Government to provide and 
finance universalized quality basic education”.
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duties. The collected amount does not go to the general public accounts, but is allocated for 
their specific purpose in the fields of education and health.191
The approach of Brazil can be used as another example. A National Fund for Education 
Development (FNDE) linked to the Ministry of Education already exists. The main goal 
of this fund is to collect financial resources to support education programmes and provide 
assistance to low-income students (such as food, books, other school supplies, transporta-
tion and so on). The contribution allocated to this fund (known as an education allowance), 
in accordance with article 212(5) of the Federal Constitution,192 is charged at the rate of 
2.5% on an employer’s total payroll. Other programmes that could be relevant to the subject 
at hand include the National Service of Industrial Apprenticeship Contributions (SENAI), 
the National Service of Commercial Apprenticeship Contributions (SENAC)193 and the 
Contributions for Supporting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SEBRAE).194
Another example can be found in Nigeria. The government implemented an education tax 
that is allocable to the Education Tax Fund,195 at 2%, which is levied on the assessable profits 
of every company registered in the country (it means that non-residents companies or the 
ones that were not incorporated in accordance with Nigerian legislation are exempt from 
the tax at stake).196 The Fund was created for the purposes of rehabilitation, restoration and 
consolidation of the education system at federal, state and local levels, giving special atten-
tion to higher education. The assessment and collection of the education tax is attributable 
to the Federal Inland Revenue Service. An interesting study regarding the impact of this 
education tax in Nigeria was published with the conclusion that it has significant positive 
impact on human capital development in both the short and long term. The ultimate rec-
ommendation was to continue with the tax.197 
Similarly, in Jamaica, an education tax was established in 1983 to support the Ministry of 
Education to finance education programmes in accordance with the Education Tax Act. The 
191. For a detailed discussion, see A.P. Kotha & P. Talekar, Cess Taxes in India: A Rights Based Analysis 
of Earmarking, UNSW Business School, available at https://www.business.unsw.edu.au/About-Site/
Schools-Site/Taxation-Business-Law-Site/Documents/6-Kotha-and-Talekar-ATTA2018.pdf. 
192. Art. 212: “The Union shall apply annually not less than eighteen percent of its tax revenues, and the States, 
Federal District and Counties at least twenty-five percent of their tax revenues, including revenues result-
ing from transfers, for maintenance and development of education. […] §5°. Basic public education shall 
have as an additional source of financing the educational salary assessment, collected from companies, 
as provided by law.” BR: Federal Constitution, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/consti 
tuicao/constituicao.htm. 
193. SENAC and SENAI social contributions, paid monthly, are payroll taxes and the rates are defined by 
reference to their payroll and the number of workers. V. Arruda Ferreira, Brazil - Corporate Taxation sec. 
4., Country Tax Guides IBFD (accessed 18 July 2020).
194. SEBRAE contribution is also a payroll tax that is levied as an additional contribution to SENAI/SENAC 
at the rate of 0.3% for the purposes of promoting medium and small enterprises. See V. Arruda Ferreira, 
Brazil - Corporate Taxation sec. 4., Country Tax Guides IBFD (accessed 18 July 2020).
195. The Education Tax Fund (ETF) was established by Education Tax Act no. 7 of 1993 and amended by Act 
no. 40 of 22 December 1998.
196. O.A. Oraka, C. Ogbodo & R. Ezejiofor. Effect of Tertiary Education Tax Fund (Tetfund) in Management of 
Nigerian Tertiary Institutions, 2 International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development 
(IJTSRD) 1 (Dec. 2017), available at https://www.ijtsrd.com/management/accounting-and-finance/5909/
effect-of-tertiary-education-tax-fund-tetfund-in--management-of-nigerian-tertiary-institutions/
dr-a-o-oraka.
197. T.A. Adegbite, Empiracal Analysis of the Effect of Education Tax on Human Capital Development in 
Nigeria, 6 International Journal of Research in Engineering and Applied Sciences 12 (Dec. 2016), 
available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327273786_EMPIRICAL_ANALYSIS_OF_THE_
EFFECT_OF_EDUCATION_TAX_ON_HUMAN_CAPITAL_DEVELOPMENT_IN_NIGERIA. 
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taxpayers are (i) employees over 18 years (retired people not included); (ii) self-employed 
people who derive a minimum wage; and (iii) employers (companies incorporated or regis-
tered in Jamaica). In this regard, the education tax is levied on the emoluments of employees 
and the chargeable income of self-employed persons at a rate of 2.25%. Additionally, the 
employer must contribute with 3.5% on the amount paid.198
Leveraging from the above models, we also propose that governments introduce the 
so-called education tax to finance education and the introduction of skills required by 
the new economic and technological setting. In situations where constitutional provisions 
allow the imposition of taxes, fees or cess for education purposes, the creation and imple-
mentation of a fund would be straightforward. This would not involve any complexity or 
considerable changes in the tax systems. All taxpayers (individuals or businesses) would 
make certain contributions. In an AI/robots context, this programme would mainly allow 
the “replaced” worker to access professional education (for example by financing short-term 
courses, training courses, technical colleges and universities) in order to ensure that they 
are reskilled to meet the needs of the future. It is quite important that this specific purpose 
is well communicated to the general public without any sign of vagueness so that the tax-
payer is aware of why they are paying this additional amount.
5.3.  General measures vs earmarked measures 
5.3.1.  General measures not restricted to the AI/robots issue 
One may raise the question as to why we favour an earmarked measure over more general 
measures. With respect to the latter, some scholars have discussed or advocated general 
changes in the direct or indirect tax areas to address the threat of automation and ensure 
income redistribution. 
Oberson considers the possibility of increasing the corporate tax rates.199 While this option 
is certainly attractive, as it applies to all businesses, this measure should not be considered 
in isolation and should be considered in the wider context of the tax system. 
On the other hand, in an indirect tax context, Arndts and Kapper argue that the tax base 
should be shifted to consumption as opposed to production to address the issue at stake. 
This is because consumption taxes are less distortive than income taxes (profit shifting 
concerns). Thus, a possible solution would be to simply increase the VAT rates.200 However, 
unlike direct taxes, VAT systems do not differentiate between consumption by the rich or 
the middle class or the poor. Consumption taxes could probably then place the burden of 
the issue at stake on the part of society whose jobs are prone to be automated or to the parts 
of society that would probably become unemployed (routine workers). 
More insightful proposals are advanced by Mazur. She argues that under the existing 
direct tax system, capital income is taxed more favourably than labour income. As a result, 
she proposes that capital income should be taxed similarly to employment income. In the 
US context, one option is to modify the payroll tax on labour income (by making it more 
attractive for employers) and broadening the payroll tax applicable on capital income of 
198. See T. Francis, Jamaica - Individual Taxation secs. 4. and 4.3., Country Tax Guides IBFD (accessed on 
27 May 2020).
199. Oberson, supra n. 85, at p. 139.
200. J. Arndts & K. Kappner, Taxing Artificial Intelligences, IREF Working Paper No. 201902, pp. 19-22 (2019), 
available at https://en.irefeurope.org/SITES/en.irefeurope.org/IMG/pdf/arndts_and_kappner_final.pdf. 
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high-income individuals.201 Another option is to tax capital income. Under the current 
tax system of many countries (including the United States) capital gains and dividends are 
taxed at beneficial rates. Mazur argues that the beneficial treatment of such income streams 
should be withdrawn and they should be taxed on a par with labour income. At the same 
time, she argues that tax expenditures that significantly subsidize the creation of capital 
income for businesses (e.g. accelerated depreciation or bonus expensing) should be cur-
tailed. Other interesting measures are also proposed to tax capital income.202 The authors’ 
view is that although her proposals are solid and have substantial merits, they are funda-
mental in nature. She admits that “the changes will not sufficiently counteract the predicted 
disruption of the current workforce, the negative social and personal welfare implications 
associated with unemployment, and the growing inequality gap. Accordingly, tax policy 
alone cannot solve all of the issues raised by the robotics revolution”.203 As a result, she 
indicates that government tax expenditure should be targeted at reskilling workers and 
empowering them. She states “In short, by seeking to fill existing and new jobs, rather than 
prolonging the inefficient use of human labor in unnecessary tasks, this direct spending of 
resources is superior to using a robot tax to address the harmful effects of automation and 
is a positive complement to the tax policy changes suggested above”.204 
Indeed, her proposals will raise revenues by making general changes to the tax system, but 
there is no guarantee that the government will expend the money raised for education pur-
poses. This is where the earmarking programme comes into the picture. 
5.3.2.  Benefits of an earmarked measure 
Earmarking can be done in various ways, for example, full earmarking, partial earmarking, 
hard earmarking or soft earmarking. While the pros and cons of earmarking has been dis-
cussed extensively, it does have the potential to raise revenues for dedicated causes. First, 
earmarking is a measure to protect projects that are socially important and vital for the cit-
izens.205 In other words, socially important projects will receive a dedicated source of funds. 
Second, as such taxes, more often than not, come with an accountability mechanism,206 
they can avoid wasteful government spending and thus can prove to be cost-saving for the 
public sector.207 Third, there is no doubt that an individual or a business will pay taxes more 
satisfactorily208 if they are sure about the cause that has been financed, particularly if it is 
a social cause such as the financing of educational or awareness programmes to deal with 
planetary or global issues. In this respect, earmarking can encourage taxpayers to contrib-
ute to public coffers and at the same time reduce the opposition to pay taxes given the fact 
201. Mazur, supra n. 54, at pp. 305-312.
202. Id., at pp. 313-322.
203. Id., at p. 323.
204. Id., at p. 325.
205. IMF, Case for Earmarked Taxes: Theory and Example (Jan. 1988), available at https://www.elibrary.
imf.org/view/IMF001/14514-9781451922677/14514-9781451922677/14514-9781451922677_A001.xml? 
language=en&redirect=true&redirect=true. 
206. ECONEX, Funding the NHI – Earmarked Tax, Health Reform Note 14 (Aug. 2011), available at https://
econex.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/econex_health-reform-note_14.pdf. 
207. R.S. Teja, The Case for Earmarked Taxes, 35 Staff Papers (International Monetary Fund) 3, p. 531 
(September 1988), available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/3867185?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. 
208. ECONEX, supra n. 206.
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that the revenue is being allocated for noble causes.209 Fourth, with respect to earmarking 
taxes for education programmes, some studies indicate that, after their implementation, an 
improvement in education spending and quality was verified.210 As an illustration, India’s 
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) programme reported improved performance regarding the 
allocation of resources, building of infrastructure, hiring and training of educators, and so 
forth.211 Finally, a programme with a dedicated revenue source may be harder to eliminate 
than a non-funded programme). In light of this, the authors now express their opinion on 
who should pay such taxes. 
5.4.  Tax to be paid by businesses (companies) 
As a starting point, every business (as a separate entity) will be subject to this tax consider-
ing that each business or company uses automation or artificial intelligence to some extent. 
That said, a revenue threshold will need to be developed for reasons of efficiency. This means 
that small enterprises would be out of the scope of the contribution. Premised on OECD,212 
UN213 and EU214 data, the fund contribution would be applied to entities/self-employed busi-
nesses that have annual turnover that exceeds, for instance, EUR 50 million. This threshold 
is a suggestion and it should be adapted in accordance with the social and economic cir-
cumstances of each state.
The base of the contribution would be the total profit made (accounting profit215 or taxable 
profit216 – whichever is higher). That is because, in many jurisdictions, accounting profit 
may differ from taxable profits.217 Moreover, tax incentives (e.g. input or output incentives) 
may reduce the taxable profit base of the business as opposed to accounting profits. The 
209. D. Archer, Action Aid Research Report for the International Commission on Financing Global Education: 
Domestic Tax and Education, p. 39, available at https://report.educationcommission.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/11/Domestic-Tax-and-Eduction.pdf.
210. D. Archer, Action Aid Research Report for the International Commission on Financing Global 
Education: Domestic Tax and Education, p. 41, available at https://report.educationcommission.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Domestic-Tax-and-Eduction.pdf.
211. A. Mukherjee, Targeting Education Financing on the Marginalized: Lessons from Implementation of Sarva 
Shiksha Abhiyan and Right to Education in India, Background Paper for UNESCO, p. 2 (2013), available 
at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002259/225951E.pdf. 
212. According to OECD Glossary, “small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are non-subsidiary, indepen-
dent firms which employ fewer than a given number of employees. This number varies across countries. 
The most frequent upper limit designating an SME is 250 employees, as in the European Union. However, 
some countries set the limit at 200 employees, while the United States considers SMEs to include firms 
with fewer than 500 employees”. Small and Medium-Sized Entreprises (SMES), Glossary of Statistics 
Terms, Glossary OECD, available at https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3123. 
213. As reported by the UN, (i) micro-enterprise: fewer than 10 employees and an annual turnover (the 
amount of money taken in a particular period) or balance sheet (a statement of a company's assets and 
liabilities) below EUR 2 million; (ii) small enterprise: fewer than 50 employees and an annual turnover or 
balance sheet below EUR 10 million; (iii) medium-sized enterprise: fewer than 250 employees and annual 
turnover below EUR 50 million or balance sheet below EUR 43 million. 
214. The European Union has adopted the same criteria as the UN. European Commission, What is an SME? 
Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, available at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/
business-friendly-environment/sme-definition_en. 
215. IAS 12 defines accounting profit as “profit or loss for a period before deducting tax expense”. 
216. IAS 12 identifies taxable profit (tax loss) as “the profit (loss) for a period, determined in accordance with 
the rules established by the taxation authorities, upon which income taxes are payable (recoverable)”.
217. For example, in 2006, the Interpretations Committee indicated that a tax profit is not necessarily the 
same as an accounting profit. Consequently, income taxes calculated in accordance with IAS 12 do not 
have to originate from an accounting profit. E. Eberhartinger & A. Patloch, Definition of Income Taxes, 
in Tax Accounting: Unravelling the Mystery of Income Taxes (7 Apr. 2015), Books IBFD.
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rate of the contribution could be based on a certain percentage of the accounting or taxable 
profits (e.g. 1% to 3%).218 
The information regarding taxable basis, tax rate and due amount can be integrated in a 
tax return that is already submitted by businesses or companies (such as a corporate tax 
return). By doing so, this would avoid more compliance complexities and costs. The pay-
ment could be done on an annual basis, according to the profit accrued during a tax year. 
5.5.  Taxes to be paid by individuals
Individuals will be the ones who benefit most from this fund. Nevertheless, it would not 
make sense to charge the contribution at stake from the ones who are unemployed and who 
are currently looking for relocation. Accordingly, workers that maintain their employment 
status during the Fourth Industrial Revolution – meaning people who actually work – can 
also contribute to the fund to support education programmes based on the gross annual 
salary they earn.
From a social perception perspective, it would be worth mentioning that tax debates per-
taining to individual taxation usually focus on the rich or the poor. In this context, the 
middle class is the most affected by tax progressivity around the world, founded on the 
premise that lower income people are mostly exempt, whilst higher income groups have 
more sources of income and often hire tax professionals to take advantage of loopholes, tax 
schemes and exemptions.
Based on research performed by Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman (economists at 
Berkeley University), the 400 richest American families paid a lower overall tax rate than 
middle-class American families in 2018, as per Figure 7.219 
Considering this data, the authors believe that it would not be a good idea to increase the 
tax burden of the middle class. Moreover, our argument is based on a recent study by the 
OECD, which pointed out that one in six current middle-income jobs face a high risk of 
automation220 (see Figure 8). 
Thus, the authors’ suggestion would address high-income individuals. The definition of a 
high-income individual would also depend on each state according to the economic and 
social reality of each country. As an illustration, the authors refer to the chart below to 
define the meaning of individuals at the upper threshold of income221 (see Figure 9). 
Therefore, an individual revenue threshold would be state specific. A percentage of the 
income crossing the revenue threshold would be subject to the contribution. For example, 
if Mr X in State X derives USD 100,000 of taxable income (net of deductions) and if the 
threshold is fixed at USD 80,000, the excess, that is USD 20,000, would be the taxable base 
218. IFR, Robot Investment Reaches Record 16.5 billion USD (18 September 2019), IRF Press Release, avail-
able at https://ifr.org/downloads/press2018/2019-09-18_Press_Release_IFR_World_Robotics_2019_
Industrial_Robots_English.pdf. 
219. H. Gleckman, Are US Billionaires Really Paying A Lower Tax Rate Than Working People? Probably Not, 
Forbes (11 Oct. 2019), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2019/10/11/are-us- 
billionaires-really-paying-a-lower-tax-rate-than-working-people-probably-not/#549e8fc629ac. 
220. OECD, Under Pressure: The Squeezed Middle Class p. 29 (OECD 2019), available at https://doi.
org/10.1787/689afed1-en.
221. Id., at p. 20. 
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of the contribution. A certain percentage of the excess will be paid as an education tax (for 
example, 1% to 3%). When fixing percentages, policy officials should consider many factors 
such as the population size, expenses, living costs, marital status, family members and so 
forth. To facilitate regular payment of this tax, the employer could withhold the levy and 
pay it to the authorities (for salaried individuals). Alternatively, the individual, could pay it 
while filing their tax return. 
Figure 7 – Effective US tax rates by income
Figure 8 – Share of workers in occupations with high risk of automation, by income class
Note: “Lower income” households defined as households with income below 75% of the national median. “Middle 
income” households are households with income between 75% and two times the national median. “Upper income” 
households are households with income above two times the national median. The risk of automation is calculated as 
the average of the risks of automation by occupation, weighted by the share of each occupation in the income class.
Source: OECD secretariat calculations based on LIS and PIAAC.
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5.6.  Assessing our proposal 
Our proposal is neutral, as it applies to all individuals and businesses that exceed a certain 
revenue threshold. The design of a threshold is important for efficiency reasons. Depending 
on the jurisdiction, a simple law or similar legal act would be enough to regulate the appli-
cation of such taxes. The law would be based on objective factors to foster tax certainty. 
Also, costs of compliance with this measure for both taxpayers and tax administration 
would be low. Calculation of the tax would be simple for taxpayers. Further, existing tax 
returns could be partially modified by the tax administration to ensure taxpayers com-
pliance with the measure. Ensuring compliance would also limit opportunities for tax 
evasion. The measure is flexible, in the sense that the contributions could be increased or 
decreased, or the tax could be repealed based on reliable economic data.222 The proposal also 
complies with the benefit principle, as taxpayers who make this contribution (individuals 
or businesses) benefit from general state resources (including Industry 4.0). Also, as the tax 
is payable by businesses or individuals who have profits or disposable income respectively, 
it would be compliant with the ability to pay principle. Of course, profit shifting (and tax 
competition) can still occur if these taxes are not introduced in a unified manner, especially 
by developed countries. One important point is that many countries, for example Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands, have created tax incentives in their 
corporate and individual income tax codes for investment in education and training pro-
grammes,223 and our solution should not be seen as incompatible with these systems given 
its objective of educating the public on global issues. 
On the international tax side, the option proposed above will mostly likely constitute a tax 
that is covered by a tax treaty, in particular, article 2 of the OECD Model as it is applicable 
222. Some economists argue that it is optimal to tax robots only for the first three decades as during this peri-
od, the labour force still includes older workers that chose their occupation in the past. However, once 
these generations retire then optimal robot taxation is zero. See J. Guerreiro, S. Rebelo & P. Teles, Should 
Robots be Taxed?, NBER Working Paper Series (Revised Paper, Aug. 2020), available at https://www.nber.
org/papers/w23806.pdf. 
223. For further details, see EU CEDEFOP. Using Tax Incentives to Promote Education and Training, Cedefop 
Panorama Series (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 2009), available at https://
www.cedefop.europa.eu/files/5180_en.pdf. 
Figure 9 – Lower and upper middle-income thresholds in USD 2010 PPPs, 2016 or latest year available
Note: Middle-income classes and median incomes defined based on equivalized household disposable income, 
corrected for household size. The middle-income class comprises individuals in households with income between 
75% and 200% of the median. Values in USD, adjusted for international differences in 2010 purchasing power parities.
Source: OECD.
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on income derived by a taxpayer. If this is the case, then the application of such taxes could 
be restricted by tax treaties in many instances. For example, if a resident in Country R 
derives substantial business income from its tax treaty partner, that is, Country S (a state 
that has introduced an education tax), then article 7 of the OECD Model (which deals with 
business income) will switch off the application of such taxes unless and until the taxpay-
er maintains a permanent establishment in Country S. In other words, unless and until 
Country S receives unlimited taxing rights under tax treaties, it will not be able to enforce 
its education tax. Thus, the tax could fail to operate in a cross-border scenario unless and 
until states agree to its implementation in all scenarios either through bilateral negotiations 
or through the Multilateral Instrument (MLI). In light of this issue, a possible policy choice 
would be to simply collect taxes from residents and not non-residents. 
If such taxes are only collected from local tax residents, the proposal presented above suffers 
from one inherent flaw, namely, it is based on the view of the world in which fiscal pre-
rogatives are completely in the hands of sovereign nation states. Although this view of the 
world is realistic, it fails when it comes to resolving increasingly global and interconnected 
problems. Firstly, those states which do possess fiscal potential to successfully implement 
an Education Tax may actually, due to the demographic decline previously described, be in 
a need of additional skilled workforce from abroad. Their investment in the local workforce 
may not be sufficient to meet the needs of their own economy and society in general, simply 
due to the fact that the domestic pool of potential employees is shrinking so rapidly that not 
even AI/robots are able to make up for the shortfall. On the other hand, countries that do 
possess the long-term potential to supply the needed immigration are the ones that cannot 
rely on their own fiscal base to provide much-needed investment in education. Furthermore, 
even if they were capable of financing successful education programmes, these would to a 
large degree only serve to provide developed countries with more skilled immigration, as 
the local economies would not have the potential to provide the newly educated youth with 
sufficient employment opportunities. Thus, as it would be safe to assume that many if not 
most of those who benefited from education programmes in developing countries would 
attempt to pursue their lives in other parts of the world, where they can expect not only 
higher wages but also a more politically stable environment, one can reasonably question 
the justification of programmes that may in the end result in the taxpayers of impoverished 
countries financing the needs of the taxpayers of the world’s most affluent nations. 
One lesson that we can draw with some surety from our experience so far is that future 
migration flows cannot be stemmed by one-sided government measures. Simply building 
walls and employing more border guards may perhaps slow the tide for a while, but in the 
long run these are futile measures. If a continent such as Africa, where half of all people 
are under the age of 15, is left to its current state, what is to stop these multitudes of youths, 
who are well aware that the world offers environments with much more prospects, from 
actually trying to reach them? The same conclusion can be made with respect to the other 
part of the old world, which at present has an abundance of young people to whom it can 
offer for the time being only a bleak future, namely the Middle East and parts of Central 
Asia. Furthermore, all of these areas of the world are expected to be worst hit by climate 
change, rendering large tracts of their territory uninhabitable. 
Thus, we face the following conundrum at the global level. The places on the globe that can 
fund investments in education may not have sufficient human capital towards whom these 
investments could be targeted, while those that do possess the human capital may not have 
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the financial means and are also, due to the derelict state of their economies and societies, in 
danger of actually preparing, at their own cost, future immigrants whose talents and skills 
will be put to work by some other, much more prosperous, economy. On the other hand, we 
are already aware that unskilled migrants will not give up their dream of finding a better 
life in a new environment purely because there is no need for them and the services they 
can provide in their destination of choice. Sound economic reasoning may be persuasive in 
an academic or a political debate setting, but it is not likely to alter the dream of escaping 
truly desperate circumstances of a young person full of energy and zeal. In other words, the 
world’s developed countries will not be able to avoid the tides of migration.
6.  Our Recommendation: Global (Intercontinental) Fiscal Redistribution in Lieu of a 
Global Education Tax and the Road towards a Planetary Tax System
Tax scholarship has provided some guidance on how to address the described problem in 
the form of the Bhagwati brain drain tax. This is a tax paid or transferred to the country 
of origin of the skilled immigrant by his host state in order to compensate it for the loss 
incurred due to the emigration of a skilled individual. Under the initial proposal, this 
brain drain tax was to be borne by the skilled immigrant (i.e., it would be paid in addition 
to what is owed under general rules of their adopted country of residence).224 More recent 
proposals shift the burden from the immigrant to the host country,225 while Brauner draws 
attention to the policy merits a brain drain tax should meet in order to be a justified and 
valid development tool and not just another channel for enriching the corrupt elites in 
developing countries.226
Drawing on existing research, the authors would propose a global mechanism that would 
enable the transfer of funds from developed countries that rely on immigration to devel-
oping countries who are the source of human capital. However, unlike in the current aid 
setting, this mechanism would take on a fiscal transfer form, wherein, on the basis of a pre-
determined formula, a certain proportion (indeed, a low percentage) of the host country’s 
tax revenues would be distributed to the countries that are the current and future sources 
of immigration (rather than finding isolated solutions at the level of individual income tax 
or corporate income tax or VAT). However, contrary to what the article advocated for on 
the domestic front, at the international level, the authors would argue against an earmarked 
approach, namely because, at this point of societal development, our global allegiances are 
much weaker than those most of us feel towards the polities we are a part of. As the COVID-
19 pandemic has painfully reminded us, in times of trouble parochial interests easily take 
political precedence over broader, planetary ones, regardless of the fact that the problem in 
need of solving is blind to both national boundaries of political sensitivities. In other words, 
if an earmarked revenue were to be introduced to fund the development of some other soci-
ety, then it may be the first to fall as victim of the next crisis requiring economic stringency, 
regardless of the fact that it may equally be to the benefit of the tax-levying jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, such an earmarked tax would be an easy point of call for all xenophobic and 
224. See J.N. Bhagwati, Taxing the Brain Drain, 19 Challenge 3, p. 35 (1976).
225. See M.J. Lister, A Tax Credit Approach to Addressing the Brain Drain, 62 St. Louis University Law 
Journal  1, p. 74 (2017). For economics research with respect to the issue of the brain drain tax, see 
J.  Douglas Wilson, A Voluntary Brain-Drain Tax, 92 Journal of Public Economics 12, pp. 2385-2391 
(2008).
226. See Y. Brauner, Brain Drain Taxation as Development Policy, 55 St. Louis University Law Journal 1, 
pp. 262-263 (2010). 
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isolationist political forces in any society. On the other hand, we must avoid the trap of 
defining the transfer as an aid mechanism as these carry an equally dangerous political 
burden. Aid is understood as an act of generosity, devoid of self-interest concerns. However, 
the fiscal redistribution mechanism the authors propose serves the interests of both the 
providing and the receiving countries. In the case of uncontrolled immigration of unskilled 
labour to countries that have no need for it, the host nations will have to deal with and bear 
the costs of not only training and educating the new arrivals (at present costs on their mar-
kets, which are bound to be far higher than those in the countries of emigration), but also 
mitigating far more radical social turmoil than what we are witnessing in present reality. 
In other words, while we should avoid stretching our solidarity capability too far by virtue 
of introducing earmarked taxes bound to be viewed as at the very least hidden foreign aid, 
we should build upon developing our broader allegiances by developing an understating of 
our interconnected destinies. To put such a conclusion into perspective, one should bear in 
mind that e.g. in July 1960, when it became independent, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
had a total of 16 domestic university graduates on a population of more than 15 million, 
simply due to the fact that the colonial power which had ruled it until that time (Belgium) 
would not allow locals to be educated at a higher level (as it felt that by virtue of education 
the natives were becoming radical).227
Such a fiscal redistribution mechanism could serve as a foundation for the introduction of 
a global fiscal form, one which is broader, is not restricted by the Bhagwatian foundations, 
and considers the “social contract” of an individual or business as not limited to the bound-
aries of its state but rather to that of the entire planet. Such a fiscal form could be used to 
fund global action against threats that target our very existence as a species (e.g. climate 
change and global warming).
Based on the chosen option, the use of transferred funds must be subject to a strict mech-
anism of control. Their use would be limited to education or more broadly towards health-
care, environment, basic public services and infrastructure, with the improvement in the 
status of and the empowerment of women being a crucial goal, as it is gender equality that 
can most successfully lower the unsustainable birth rates that are presently found in the 
world’s poorest countries. Furthermore, unlike the Bhagwatian model, the new mechanism 
must not only take into account the economic aspects of past and current immigration flows 
but must in essence serve to mitigate as much a possible the future migration flows that 
will be accelerated by virtue of climate change. If predictions hold true that a few billion 
(approximately one third of all humanity) of the world’s population will need to resettle 
within this century, the proposed mechanism will serve to finance the preparation of the 
prospective workforce for the new environment that is expecting them. To reflect on our 
past experiences, as the gates cannot be closed, nor walls built high enough (e.g. neither the 
Roman limes, nor the Great Wall of China managed to accomplish their tasks), it stands to 
reason to start working together with those who will be forced to come some time in the 
future, so as to make their settlement as amicable as possible.
The primary reason why it should be a fiscal, rather than an aid mechanism to implement 
the authors’ proposal is that it is imperative to reflect the reality that the countries that 
227. See B.B. Fall, Education in the Republic of Congo, 30 Journal of Negro Education 3, pp. 271-272 (1961),; 
and J.A. Kennedy, Congo’s Basic Problems III – Prime Need is Education; Only 19 Native Congolese College 
Graduates There, The Daily Times (28 Apr. 1961). 
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will be the source of the transfers are not providing one-sided aid to those in need, but are 
actually investing in their own long-term prosperity. In other words, the authors are not 
proposing a charitable donation strategy, but rather a global initiative to finance global 
challenges; challenges that are set to impact us all.
While the functioning of the fiscal redistribution mechanism would naturally require a 
global multilateral platform, it is not the technical details that would be the greatest obsta-
cle to its success. Such a mechanism would in any eventuality require a novel, global, or as 
global as possible, social contract with the aim to fund the resolution of planetary issues. 
As it would make little sense to divest demographics from climate change, this social con-
tract would in essence serve to protect the interest of humans as a species. Sadly, the recent 
opportunity to jointly, as a united front, combat an enemy that sees all of us in the most 
non-discriminatory fashion, namely the COVID-19 virus, was lost, as we put our faith in 
that a virus will respect the sanctity of legal fiction, such as national boundaries. Thus, as 
tax academics, we must remind political decision-makers that it is up to them to provide a 
platform for the implementation of particular solutions. These must be global in order to be 
effective, and therefore so must be the platform. 
However, prior to a global mechanism, the authors can suggest the setting up of at least two 
continental or intercontinental mechanisms. 
Namely, the European Union is bound to be the destination for the vast majority of African 
immigration, particularly its uncontrolled (formally illegal) spectre.228 Simply the vastness 
of the Atlantic Ocean will serve as a natural deterrent for an American passage, at least 
for the time being. In order to maintain its level of prosperity, the European Union will 
need immigrants, while technological progress will require these to have valuable skills. 
However, the use of AI/robots will lower the need for human capital, whose uncontrolled 
import also leads to very complex social and political issues. On the other hand, current 
demographic and economic data, in combination with the failure to successfully stop immi-
gration tides, suggests that it is with some surety that we can expect an ever-increasing wave 
of new settlers from Africa into the continent of Europe. Furthermore, the new settlement 
will not be distributed evenly, but will be more prevalent in the most affluent parts of the 
continent. On the basis of such an assessment, there are at least four clear policy goals to 
be accomplished:
(a) Develop the skills of prospective immigrants so that they can bring these to their host 
countries, enabling them to integrate more quickly and use their full potential.
(b) Create local opportunities in the countries of origin for their ever-increasing young 
populations, thus mitigating the calamitous consequences of the brain drain on devel-
opment.
(c) Stem the population explosion in places that are unable to sustain them in the long run 
– a goal best achieved, as the world’s developed nations’ stories testify, by virtue of edu-
cation, the empowerment of women, and economic and infrastructure development.
228. Here we must give credence to the inspirational speech given by Prof. Frans Vanistendael at the 2020 
annual meeting of the EATLP in which he specifically underlined the importance of Europe/Africa rela-
tions for the future of both continents.
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(d) Enable a more even dispersal of new immigrants within the European Union (or more 
broadly continent).
As stated in this section, the percentage to be transferred (from national budgets) would 
depend on a formula that would have to take into account the following factors:
– the current level of immigration and the economic benefit it brings to the host state, as 
well as the sources of such immigration;
– the future level of immigration (taking into account climate change) and the cost of 
undesired, but unavoidable immigration; and 
– the benefits of needed immigration flows and the cost of the development of skills the 
new immigrants should ideally bring with them.
The collecting entity would be the European Union, with its Commission being in charge of 
overseeing the administrative implementation of the entire mechanism.
The distribution mechanism would also need to be settled, bearing in mind that it has two 
targets. Namely, on the one hand, the funds should be transferred to those countries that 
are the source of immigration, but on the other they should also be diverted to those nations 
on the European continent that have been in the past and are still the source of immigra-
tion, but which will in the future have to accept the role of the host countries in order to 
have a more even distribution of new arrivals. Namely, in order for a proportional number 
of the new immigrants to be voluntarily shared between European countries, they need to 
achieve a comparable level of development, i.e. a comparable ability to provide new arrivals 
with equal opportunities. If such comparability is not achieved, so that the only argument 
that remains to incite new immigrants to choose less affluent jurisdictions as their new 
home is force, it would be an argument of limited value, particularly in the long run.
In the case of African countries, the GDP per capita in addition to demographic statistics 
can be used as the basis for distribution, while in the case of future host countries similar 
criterion can be taken into consideration, with particular attention being given to the costs 
incurred by them through the process of the brain drain (a process which in itself limits 
growth potential).
While the collection of the funds can be entrusted to the European Union, the use of 
the funds must be in the domain of national governments, and the monitoring of their 
spending must be a more complex affair. Namely, if we were to entrust the monitoring of 
the spending solely to the organization made up of the countries that are the source of the 
funds, we would inadvertently be replicating the not-so-distant colonial past, something 
that would hardly be acceptable to the recipient nations. Thus, there would need to be a 
clear set of standards in order to outline the purposes for which the received funds could be 
spent, the processes under which they can be allocated by national governments and their 
authorities and a strict peer review mechanism that would involve both the source and the 
recipient countries. The receiving nations should be able to scrutinize their peers as they 
have a vested interest in the success of the programme, while the failure of a peer review 
process would entail not only the termination of the transfer of funds, but an obligation to 
sanction the sale of such goods and services that were acquired by virtue of their abuse, as 
well as the persons benefiting from such abuse. The sanctions mechanism should naturally 
encompass all countries taking part in the programme.
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The described mechanism would entail two separate legal foundations. One would have to 
be an intra-EU treaty, outlining the obligation to contribute funds, determining the for-
mula for the assessment of the size of the contribution and providing for a redistribution 
mechanism targeting those European states that have been the source of immigration to 
other European nations and who will in the future be expected to host the new arrivals. 
Such a treaty should also encompass those countries on the continent of Europe that are 
not members of the European Union (with perhaps the exception of Russia, which is the 
target of immigration primarily from Central Asia and the Caucasus region), where failure 
to partake in this process would be connected with economic penalties for the refusing 
state. The other would be a multilateral treaty between African countries and the European 
Union (representing not only its Member States, but all European nations who join the 
mechanism) outlining the distribution, spending, reporting as well as the peer review stan-
dards and procedures. 
A similar mechanism, although one that would require the development of administrative 
capacities, in the absence of a structure corresponding to the European Union, could be 
introduced in the Americas, where on the one side would be the United States and Canada, 
and on the other primarily Central American states and a selected number, if not all, of 
South American ones.
However, such intercontinental solutions should be only temporary as the authors reiterate 
that the only way to truly address global issues would be through global action. Perhaps, 
the OECD’s Inclusive Framework could be entrusted with carrying out such a task at the 
global level. On the other hand, the two suggested stepping stones in reaching this goal 
are possible, and actually, in the case of the EU/Africa mechanism, there already exists an 
administrative platform capable of carrying out such a task.
7.  Conclusion
Based on the transformation has been taking place in the world and the uncertainty about 
how things will shape in the future, the discussion regarding taxation of AI/robots will still 
continue for a while. This is because we are not even sure if high rates of unemployment 
will infiltrate the society due to replacement of human workforce by machines, keeping in 
mind that studies conducted by several respected institutions reach different conclusions.
The wide range of targeted proposals that have been presented so far could be difficult to 
implement, besides the fact that most of them violate commonly accepted principles of tax 
policy, such as neutrality, simplicity/certainty, efficiency, effectiveness and fairness, as well 
as flexibility.
The authors believe that taxing AI/robots would slow down innovation, which directly 
impacts the fields of science, health, economy, security, nutrition, the environment, leisure 
and so forth. Moreover, it would also deter people from enjoying innumerable benefits aris-
ing from AI/robots in all those fields. For those reasons, the authors’ opinion is that those 
new technologies should not be taxed. 
That said, governments need to be proactive and not reactive. COVID-19 has taught this 
lesson to many “reactive” governments (in the sense that the number of people affected by 
the virus was substantially high). If it ever happens that a trend of unemployment due to, for 
example, automation is being witnessed in a state, government will need to have a damage 
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control plan in place so as to invest in people’s education. In this regard, on a national level, 
this article discussed the possibility of implementing an earmarked education tax, that is, 
a contribution that would be allocated to a special fund dedicated to finance and foster 
education programmes. 
Such a contribution would be paid by individuals and businesses, as both of them would 
benefit from the fund and hence the programmes. In the case of companies, the tax rate 
would be levied on accounting or taxable profits (whichever is higher). In the case of indi-
viduals, it will be payable when the gross annual income exceeds a certain threshold. The 
thresholds will be established in accordance with the economic reality of each country or 
region. The contribution will be made on an annual basis, and related information and 
payments would be integrated with tax returns that are already submitted by the taxpayers, 
thus avoiding an increase in compliance obligations. 
However, as many countries would not be in a position to implement or fully benefit from 
an education tax, the authors suggest building on the already existing Bhagwatian founda-
tions or a new global “social contract” argument to implement a global fiscal redistribution 
mechanism, in order to allow developing countries to escape endemic poverty, allow more 
sensible migration flows and prepare for the grim consequences that climate change is 
bringing upon us all. Unfortunately, the authors have to warn that global decision makers 
must realize that threats that target us indiscriminately as a species must also be combated 
by humanity as a whole, regardless of relatively novel social inventions such as boundaries 
and nation states.
